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PENN STATE LAW REVIEW
"Laws Iare born in the middle of expeditions, conquests, and burning
cities."
I. Introduction
Long ago, in a bygone era of barbarism, cruelty, and darkness,
before an Enlightenment era ushered in a human-rights consciousness,
before the great revolutions created space for republican government to
form and then flourish, there was the "spectacle of the scaffold."
'2
Punishment through horrific torture inflicted in the public square
heralded sovereignty through "spectacle not of measure, but of
imbalance and excess." 3 The public square became the forum for the
sovereign, "through the body of the criminal," to reactivate its power: the
scaffold in the public square "made the body of the condemned man the
place where the vengeance of the sovereign was applied, the anchoring
point for a manifestation of power, an opportunity of affirming the
dissymetry [sic] of forces."4 The public sphere was where sovereignty
announced itself.
As the public sphere changed its character through the transition of
Western societies from a medieval age to a modernist one, punishment
receded from view, with prisons sustaining rural economies, far away
from crowded cities and suburbs. The trial and the judge's imposition of
sentence became the symbol and expression of the penal justice system.
The criminal-justice process, with the "trial" as its crown jewel-for the
"trial" best exemplified a rationality invented in the Enlightenment era-
became the site not so much for sovereignty to manifest, but the arena for
its limitation. The transition from the "spectacle of the scaffold" to a
system of penality applying itself to a juridical subject, the possessor of
rights, marks a corresponding transition in sovereignty itself, the great
transition from the Monarch to the People. With this transition and the
associated myth of the social contract to legitimate the state, law
becomes the "fundamental manifestation of power.",
5
1. Michel Foucault, Society Must Be Defended, in 1 FOUCAULT, ETHICS:
SUBJECTIVITY AND TRUTH 61 (Paul Rabinow ed. 1994) [hereinafter FOUCAULT, ETHICS].
2. MICHEL FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH: THE BIRTH OF THE PRISON 32
(Vintage 1979) (1975) [hereinafter FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH]. For more on the
idea of the "spectacle" as an integrated and diffuse apparatus of images and ideas that
produces and regulates public discourse and opinion, see GuY DEBORD, SOCIETY OF THE
SPECTACLE (Donald Nicholson-Smith trans. 1994) (1967) and GuY DEBORD, COMMENTS
ON THE SOCIETY OF THE SPECTACLE (1990).
3. FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH, supra note 2, at 49.
4. Id. at 55; see also id. at 10.
5. FOUCAULT, ETHICS, supra note 1, at 59.
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Part I of this two-part article series (After the Gold Rush-Part I
Hamdi, 9/11, and the Dark Side of the Enlightenment6) emphasizes the
linkage between social consciousness and legal analysis, and thereby
claims that our war-on-terror jurisprudence is a manifestation of a certain
form of consciousness.7 Specifically, that article endeavors to show that
Guantanamo-style detention, and the consciousness that goes with it (a
belief in America as a normative concept, a consciousness I have termed,
gold-rush American exceptionalism) ushers in and reinforces a
resurgence of something akin to medieval sovereignty, not unlike the
sovereignty that reactivated its own power through the spectacle of the
scaffold.8 Hamdi v. Rumsfeld,9 as an exemplar of a burgeoning war-on-
terror jurisprudence, shows that the so-called war on terror is far from
lawless; it is saturated with law, but not of the sort that merely manifests
raw power. Law, the war on terror reveals, is a tactic of
governmentality, an ingredient of biopolitics, an administrative tool
where judicial power, in the case of Guantanamo detention, is exercised
in disguised fashion (as "micropower," to use Foucault's terminology)
through the discretionary acts of military personnel, from privates to
6. Daniel R. Williams, After the Gold Rush-Part I Hamdi, 9/11, and the Dark
Side of the Enlightenment, 112 PENN. STATE L. REv. 341, 349 et. seq. (2007).
7. The idea of "consciousness" is complex and, within philosophical traditions,
contested. I use the term in the rather uncontested sense of having the ability and
unremitting drive to reflect upon one's own existence and place in the world. See
ROBERTO UNGER, KNOWLEDGE AND POLITICS 200 (Free Press 1984) (1975).
Consciousness is what creates the subject-object separation that preoccupies Western
philosophy. Id. This article borrows the Heideggerean view that human activity is best
understood from the point of view of the beliefs and ideals of actors thrown into a
particular moment in history. See generally MARTIN HEIDEGGER, BEING AND TIME (John
Macquarrie & Edward Robinson trans., Harper & Row 1962) (1927).
8. Williams, supra note 6, at, 349 et. seq. The core idea behind American
exceptionalism, which allowed it to attain a firm grip within American intellectual
culture, is the "assum[ption] that American society was not only good, but that it was
itself a normative phenomenon." EDWARD A. PURCELL, JR., THE CRISIS OF DEMOCRATIC
THEORY: SCIENTIFIC NATURALISM AND THE PROBLEM OF VIRTUE 256 (Univ. Press of Ky.
1973). "In the seventeenth century the country was to be a city on a hill; in the
eighteenth, the bastion of the Laws of Nature and of Nature's God; in the nineteenth, the
last, best hope of man; and in the twentieth, quite simply, the great democratic success."
Id. at 270. The idea of linking this pax Americana consciousness to the development of a
war-on-terror jurisprudence hinges on the presupposition that all social existence is
linked to a form of consciousness: "[W]e never fully understand a phenomenon of
consciousness ... unless we can view it at the same time as a way in which men
comprehend the world and organize their relations to one another." UNGER, supra note 7,
at 108. Unger encapsulates the spirit of the analysis: "One's view on what is true of the
world as a whole, or on how the language is in fact spoken, or on how the law on a given
point stands cannot be cleanly separated from one's conception of the good, or of how the
disputed point of law ought to be resolved. The perception of fact and the choice of
values are joined together at the deepest levels of consciousness." Id. at 109.
9. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004).
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generals, who acquire their juridical authority, their micro-sovereignty,
through legal decisions like Hamdi.l0 So, not only is it misguided to
critique Guantanamo detention as "lawless," but it is also misleading to
over-characterize Hamdi and other war-on-terror cases as reflecting a
struggle over judicial deference. Arguments over institutional power as a
species of constitutional interpretation obscures the fact that violence at
Guantanamo Bay is not executive violence only; it is judicial violence,
too. 1
This article, as a follow-up to the more internationalist focus of its
predecessor,' 2 concentrates on things much closer to home-the
justificatory basis for trial by jury, the state of our public sphere and our
democratic culture, and ultimately the dangerous wholesale embrace of a
means-ends rationality that threatens to undo completely the promise of
the Enlightenment itself, which our own narrative of 9/11 tells us we are
defending in this so-called war on terror. This article shares with its
predecessor a focus on the resurgence of something akin to medieval
sovereignty.
13
Guantanamo-style detention, and Guantanamo as a symbol of a
certain consciousness about American exceptionalism and the perceived
rightness of U.S. domination in a globalized marketplace, suggests
(albeit imperfectly) a return of the spectacle, and hence the repudiation of
the Enlightenment understanding of penality-most notably in how
Hamdi silently elides the central role trial by jury plays in vitalizing our
Enlightenment heritage. Guantanamo-style detention is sovereignty
manifested much in the way the scaffold in the public square is
sovereignty manifested-both involve the sovereign's prerogative to
make war on its enemies, to manifest its power against those who dare
10. For a full explication of "biopolitics," see 1 MICHEL FOUCAULT, THE HISTORY OF
SEXUALITY, 135-59 (Robert Hurley trans., Vintage Books 1980) (1976) [hereinafter
FOUCAULT, SEXUALITY]. Foucault defines biopolitics as "the endeavor, begun in the
eighteenth century, to rationalize the problems presented to governmental practice by the
phenomena characteristic of a group of living human beings constituted as a population:
health, sanitation, birthrate, longevity, race .. " Michel Foucault, The Birth of
Biopolitics, in FOUCAULT, ETHICS, supra note 1. See also JURGEN HABERMAS, TOWARDS
A RATIONAL SOCIETY 100 et seq (Jeremy J. Shapiro trans., Beacon Press 1971) (1968).
Cf. FREDERICK A.O. SCHWARZ, JR. & AZZIS Z. HUQ, UNCHECKED AND UNBALANCED:
PRESIDENTIAL POWER IN A TIME OF TERROR 100 (The New Press 2007) (characterizing
extraordinary rendition-an offshoot of "rendition," which has been a juridical device to
"bring[] a suspect back to the United States for criminal trial"--as a "national security
tactic").
11. For a discussion of law's violence, see Robert Cover, Violence and the Word, 95
YALE L.J. 1601 (1986). For a discussion of presidential lawmaking, which is key to the
juridifying cloak draped over the so-called war on terror, see SCHWARZ & HuQ, supra
note 10, at 105-08.
12. Williams, supra note 6.
13. Id. at 361-76, 390.
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challenge it. What Foucault says about the spectacle of the scaffold can
also be said about Guantanamo: they both have a "juridico-political
function" whereby a "ceremonial" is enacted by which "a momentarily
injured sovereignty is reconstituted. It restores that sovereignty by
manifesting it at its most spectacular." 14 Viewed in this way, it seems
fitting that Guantanamo-style detention repudiates the Enlightenment
notion of the potential detainee as a possessor of rights and of detention
as the juridical deprivation of certain universally held rights (chief
among them, the right to liberty, and potentially the right to life).
This repudiation of certain Enlightenment values, and the associated
fetishism for others, will figure prominently in the presentation here. But
we must avoid, at the outset, the pitfall of understanding Hamdi as being
about the rights of a detainee. What makes a "detainee" not a prisoner is
precisely the fact that a prisoner's rights have been suspended, or taken
away, by an act of sovereignty made legitimate by the existence of a
rights-holder insisting upon a legal process that accords with the
Constitution; but the Guantanamo detainee's detention, brought about by
a sovereign act of deeming an individual irredeemably dangerous
(captured in the pseudo-legalistic term, "enemy combatant," or the geo-
political term, "terrorist"), does not involve the suspension of rights,
because the detainee never was a possessor of rights in the first place.
The core idea behind enemy-combatant detentions is the proposition that,
when it comes to certain categories of danger, individuals lose their right
to have rights; they become "bare life," to use Giorgio Agamben's
terminology. 15  What legitimates the detainee's detention is the
enactment of an administrative process calculated to ratify the accuracy
of the sovereign's deeming of the detainee to be a "terrorist." Deeming
becomes a key expression of sovereignty. The administrative
legitimation of enemy-combatant detention, which Hamdi accomplishes
jurisprudentially, 16 is the momentary fruition of an existing trajectory
towards pervasive administrative control within a disciplinary society.
After the Gold Rush, Part I highlights as significant the fact that the
Court in Hamdi never questions the sovereign's prerogative to deem who
14. FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH, supra note 2, at 48. That Guantanamo has
become something more than a place, even in the consciousness of executive branch
leaders, is captured in former Defense Department Secretary Donald Rumsfeld's order to
"Gitmoize" the interrogation procedures at Abu Ghraib, the infamous Iraqi prison.
Rumsfeld's directive, in essence, sought to intensify the harshness of the interrogations so
as to gain the intelligence-gathering results allegedly achieved at Guantanamo. See
SCHWARZ & HUQ, supra note 10, at 87.
15. GIORGIO AGAMBEN, HoMo SACER: SOVEREIGN POWER AND BARE LIFE (Werner
Hamacher & David E. Wellbery eds., Daniel Heller-Roazen trans., Stanford Univ. Press
1998) (1995). Cf FOUCAULT, SEXUALITY, supra note 10, at 135-59.
16. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004).
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is and who is not an "enemy combatant" or "terrorist"-that is, to
classify an individual as one who possesses no rights, who has lost the
right to have rights, other than a shallow prerogative to insist upon an
administrative process that to some degree ensures that the classification
itself is accurate (which, as a prerogative, is nothing more than
delegating to the detainee a role that serves to improve the administrative
decency of what is, underneath it all, rather indecent)."7 That fact,
significant in itself, is then linked to the claim that this enhanced
sovereignty arises from a particular pax Americana vision that must be
understood within the frame of our post-Cold War age of globalization.'
8
After the Gold Rush, Part I seeks to uncover a consciousness of
American exceptionalism hidden within Hamdi, somewhat like the
racial-superiority consciousness that exists hidden within McCleskey v.
Kemp, 19 the capital case where the Supreme Court rejected the Eighth
Amendment challenge to the Georgia death penalty based on statistics
showing a significant racial disparity in capital punishment.2 ° Within the
storyline of the McCleskey opinion is the construction of two competing
concerns: on the one hand, there is the unfortunate but amorphous risk of
imposing the death penalty in a racially discriminatory manner, and on
the other, there is the irreducible reality that the criminal justice system
cannot exist without myriad acts of discretion. 21  The risk of racial
discrimination is entwined with the dream of racial equality that we as a
society must pursue simultaneously in tension with the hard reality of the
need for discretion in the criminal process. To capitulate to the risk,
recast as but a dream and aspiration, is to crush the criminal justice
system itself, for the pursuit of the dream of racial equality entails
vanquishing acts of discretion that serve everyone as a solid, palpable
reality. Dreams must give way to reality in the harsh world of legal
17. This right to insist upon a certain administrative integrity in classifying one an
"enemy combatant" is only loosely a right of the detainee. It is more accurate to
conceptualize it as a delegation to the detainee of a limited power to contest a
governmental claim solely to facilitate the administrative process itself. The "rights" of
the detainee are purely instrumental, as they exist only in their usefulness to the
administrative task of designating who is and who is not an "enemy combatant." In
saying that Guantanamo-style detention regards detainees as having lost the right to have
rights, the term "rights" is used in the Kantian sense. See IMMANUEL KANT,
GROUNDWORK OF THE METAPHYSIC OF MORALS 95 et. seq. (Herbert James Paton trans.,
Barnes & Nobel, Inc. 1967) (1948); IMMANUEL KANT, LECTURES ON ETHICS 193-94
(Louis Infield trans., Harper & Row 1963) (1930). Cf SCHWARZ, supra note 10, at 85
(discussing U.S. torture policy, including Guantanamo detention, and noting the view of
"executive branch leaders" that detainees do not "deserve" rights).
18. Williams, supra note 6, at 401.
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decision-making. Racial equality is made ephemeral in the McCleskey
storyline, a feature of Martin Luther King's "dream" that we celebrate at
a designated time.22 World peace, with the United States submitting its
sovereignty to international norms and laws, is like racial equality, a
dream that we can wish for and pursue, but must give way-and with it,
any investigation into the worthiness of the pax Americana vision that
may threaten Legality itself-in the face of the harsh reality that is the
war on terror.
This hidden pax Americana consciousness may explain why
criticism of and activism against Guantanamo-style detention focuses
almost exclusively on issues of process and evidentiary reliability.23
Hamdi was applauded for at least repudiating the push to give the
Executive near-exclusive control over who gets summarily detained.24
The struggle since then has emphasized the importance of adhering to
procedures, evidentiary procedures most of all, that promote accuracy in
determining who is an "enemy combatant" and who is not.25 The result
is that the humanitarian impulse that undergirds this struggle, by
emphasizing administrative decency, may very well reinforce the
background legitimacy of what Guantanamo-style detention seeks to
accomplish for American interests in a twenty-first century era of
globalization. War-on-terror jurisprudence is thus never pressured to
consider the notion that Guantanamo-style detention does not serve the
so-called war on terror, but that the war on terror serves Guantanamo-
style detention.
Put simply, our American exceptionalism, as a fixture in our
particular consciousness about who we are as a nation, seemingly blinds
us to the more fundamental question: what precisely is the geo-political
function of Guantanamo-style detention?26 To avert terrorist attacks is
the quick and instinctive, if not thought-circumventing, response that we
accept largely because of this American exceptionalism-that, at least, is
the suggestion in After the Gold Rush, Part 1.27 We accept that
Guantanamo-style detention is an ingredient of a larger war on terror,
22. See ANTHONY G. AMSTERDAM & JEROME BRUNER, MINDING THE LAW 202-16
(2000).
23. See Williams, supra note 6, at 349 n. 26.
24. Id.
25. See infra at notes 141-142 and accompanying text.
26. To be sure, American exceptionalism and the pax Americana agenda is at the
heart of the imperial executive project that scholars like John Yoo are pursuing. See, e.g.,
Jide Nzelibe & John Yoo, Rational War and Constitutional Design, 115 YALE L.J. 2512
(2006). Yoo and others interpret Article II of the Constitution to favor Executive power
so as to create the conditions for American empire. See John Fabian Witt, Anglo-
American Empire and the Crisis of the Legal Frame, 120 HARV. L. REV. 754, 770 (2007).
27. Williams, supra note 6, at 359, 405 et. seq.
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even if we hold the view that it is a foolhardy tactic or morally
objectionable ingredient of that war. American exceptionalism, as a
form of consciousness hovering over and coursing through the analytical
veins of Hamdi, prevents us from even considering the possibility that
the converse is more true: that the so-called war on terror is an ingredient
of Guantanamo-style detention, that the larger project of pax Americana
is captured in the detention practices at Guantanamo Bay, and that the
"war on terror" exists in the service of what one scholar calls the "pre-
existing American empire-building project of global proportions."2 8 The
success or failure of Guantanamo Bay as a detention site, whether it
remains or is shut down, is therefore incidental to a larger reality that it
signifies: that globalization of a certain kind, with American economic
interests as its pivot and those interests protected by unrivaled military
dominance, is the telos of a historical progression that no political
resistance, violent or otherwise, can derail.
This article shifts the focus but preserves the theme of After the
Gold Rush, Part I. What is crucial in the transition away from the
repellant use of public torture that characterizes medieval sovereignty, as
Foucault evocatively describes it in Discipline and Punish,29 is the
evolution of the public sphere into a place congenial to democratic
institutions and practices. So long as we believe ourselves to exist within
such a public sphere, we can hardly entertain the thought that we can
retreat, or to some degree have retreated, into a form of sovereignty even
remotely akin to medieval sovereignty. Hamdi endeavors to put a veil of
administrative decency over a detention practice that signifies a resurgent
sovereignty we thought had been buried long ago amidst the memory of
the spectacle of the scaffold. It is worth contemplating whether that veil
of administrative decency takes into account highly visible signs that the
state of our public sphere betrays our consciousness about the public
sphere and scarcely corresponds to what a democratic culture demands of
it.
II. We The People and the Justification for Detaining Enemy
Combatants
It is hard to know which is the greater tragedy-that, as the twenty-
first century begins, the United States approaches the world with a
28. Richard Falk, Identifying Limits on a Borderless Map in the First Post-modern
War, in 11 SEPTEMBER 2001: WAR, TERROR AND JUDGEMENT 46 (Bulent Gokay & R.B.J.
Walker eds., Frank Cass 2d ed., 2003) (2002) (U.S. response to 9/11 part of an
"intensification of a pre-existing American empire-building project of global
proportions").
29. FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH, supra note 2.
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drawn imperial sword, or that it discredits and disables its rich and in
many ways unique republican traditions....
Jonathan Schell
30
Here is the stripped-down institutional justification for detaining
enemy combatants. Congress passed a bill, entitled the Authorization for
Use of Military Force (AUMF), 3' which in many ways is the
contemporary version of the Roman senatus consultum ultimatum, the
Roman senate decree authorizing Roman consuls to "take whatever
measures they considered necessary for the salvation of the state., 3 2 In
granting through the AUMF similar authority to the Executive,33
Congress instantiates a state of exception, the bracketing of existing legal
norms and injunctions, which is not at all unusual when a nation that
considers itself peaceful (and what nation has ever thought otherwise
about itself?) pursues military conquest. Rooting a state of exception in
something like the AUMF-that is, linking the bracketing of existing
legal norms and injunctions to legality itself-is a critical justificatory
maneuver, as Walter Benjamin observed long ago:
What the law can never tolerate-what it feels as a threat with which
it is impossible to come to terms-is the existence of a violence
outside the law; and this is not because the ends of such a violence
are incompatible with law, but because of "its mere existence outside
the law.
' 3
With any inkling of violence existing outside the law there must
immediately follow a thoroughgoing search for a regime of legality to
either sanction or condemn it. The violence of Guantanamo brings with
it precisely this search, and in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld the search yielded the
AUMF.3 5 Finding some legislative enactment (a "law") to encompass
the violence of enemy-combatant detention at Guantanamo Bay was
urgent for less-than-obvious reasons. The obvious need for the search is
the imperative to sanction the practice itself in order to preserve our
claim of being a society governed by law. But there is more to it. To not
find a source of legal authority would be to risk witnessing the infliction
of state violence outside the law, with the legitimation of that violence
30. JONATHAN SCHELL, UNCONQUERABLE WORLD 386 (2003).
31. Authorization for Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224
(2001). Congress passed the AUMF on September 14, 2001; the President signed it into
law four days later.
32. AGAMBEN, supra note 15, at 41.
33. For a critique of the AUMF, see Williams, supra note 6, at 347-49, 405-07.
34. AGAMBEN, supra note 15, at 53 (quoting Walter Benjamin).
35. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 510 (2004).
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resting solely on the political assertion of necessity. But necessity alone
cannot ground violence, though it might (and does) ground a regime of
legality that legitimates violence; if it were otherwise, if necessity were
not absorbed into law, then necessity will vanquish law itself. State
violence outside the law betrays a fidelity to the rule of law; when
accepted within a society, it establishes a juridical ontology that is itself
troubling. State violence outside the law establishes the existence of
extra-legal violence which, in the end, fatally undercuts the foundation of
legal violence. "The proper characteristic of [extra-legal] violence,"
Giorgio Agamben writes in his summary of Walter Benjamin's view of
violence outside the law, "is that it neither makes nor preserves law, but
deposes it."'36 And so, Guantanamo violence, without the AUMF, would
not merely be lawless; it would expose, in its pretense of legitimacy
rooted in bare necessity, the ontological barrenness of the criminal
justice system itself, the quintessence of legal violence in society. In that
sense, Hamdi's invocation of the AUMF not only legitimates particular
Executive activity, it more importantly preserves the criminal justice
system itself, and all legality, from the vanquishing power of extra-legal
violence. The AUMF brackets the criminal justice system in order to
save it.
That might seem an odd conclusion. After all, according to a
majority of the Justices in Hamdi, the AUMF includes the authorization
to suspend the most vitalizing institutional embodiment of our
Enlightenment heritage, the criminal justice process, with its crown
jewel, the criminal trial.37  But that suspension is mitigated by the
suggestion that this detention practice is extraordinary, exceptional, a
consequence of what we might term a "state of exception" in which we
find ourselves. The state of exception instantiated by the AUMF has
come to be called the "war on terror." Detaining enemy combatants
through the suspension of the criminal justice process is an aspect of that
"war." It is important to grasp, at this point, that "war" is not a state of
36. AGAMBEN, supra note 15, at 53.
37. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 517 ("agree[ing] with the Government's... position that
Congress has in fact authorized Hamdi's detention [without a jury trial], through the
AUMF"). The criminal trial expresses, like no other social practice, our Enlightenment
heritage. See infra notes 41-45 and accompanying text. Regarded as tantamount to a
civic religion, the criminal adjudicatory process expresses our Enlightenment heritage
because, in so many ways, profound and prosaic, it institutionally embodies our distrust
of authority and our valorization of the individual as a rational agent thus worthy of
respect. When trial by jury finally displaced trial by ordeal and trial by oath, reason
displaced faith as the guiding light of humanity. Reason became the legitimate authority
to which a person may submit; and since reason is the province of each individual self,
legitimate submission to authority is really the submission to one's own rationality. The
so-called Apprendi revolution can be conceptualized as an effort to recapture this bedrock
feature of the criminal trial.
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affairs or an observable circumstance, but more in the nature of an
expression by government actors bearing the weight of sovereignty that a
certain sovereign power must be exerted for the sake of the health and
safety of the population: a form of biopower. Hence, one hears of "war"
on poverty, or on drugs; we might recall President Franklin D.
Roosevelt's "war" against the scourge of the Great Depression-these
are significations of the exertion of sovereign power, a surge in
biopolitical sovereignty. Here, the "war on terror," among other things,
expresses through the Hamdi opinion itself an ambivalence over, even
outright aversion to, the prospect of allowing trial by jury of persons
whom we label terrorist, and thereby signals a specific surge of
sovereignty--or, as one theorist puts it, a "resurgence" of sovereignty.
38
So, the state of exception, as it might be understood in the context
of Hamdi, consists of the Sovereign's prerogative, through the passage of
the AUMF, to withhold from a U.S. citizen the legal status of criminal
defendant, without disrupting or calling into question the legal category
of "criminal defendant." Being indicted is not good news for the
indicted individual, but it does confer upon him a certain legal status
within a regime of law built upon the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, and Eighth
Amendments to the Constitution. The conferral of a legal status is a
highly significant fact, not only for the indicted defendant, but for us, we
the people, who absorb and propagate our identity as a nation. Yaser
Hamdi wanted that legal status conferred upon him, wanted we the
people to grant it to him, but the Sovereign refused-lawfully, the
Supreme Court held, notwithstanding our nation's presumed
commitment to limited government under law.39 The Sovereign's power
to instantiate a state of exception, then, is a power of refusal, a refusal to
maintain a citizen's integration within the existing political apparatus of
the state, of which the criminal-justice system is a vitalizing part, and a
refusal to maintain a citizen's integration within a community whereby
that citizen's detention must be authorized by representatives of that
community (i.e., a jury), unless that citizen lawfully consents to the
detention (i.e., pleads guilty).
Because forcible detention must occur within some regime of law--
because all violence must be subsumed within legality-Yaser Hamdi
must be given some other legal status. No person can exist as bare life in
the realm of political spectacle. Bare life must be clothed in some
juridical garb. What garb does the Sovereign say Yaser Hamdi must
drape over his bare life?
38. JUDITH BUTLER, PRECARIOUS LIFE: THE POWER OF MOURNING AND VIOLENCE 54
(2004).
39. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 534-35.
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The Sovereign has the power to do that, to drape some juridical garb
over bare life, by saying what legal status shall be conferred upon the
likes of Yaser Hamdi. The state of exception, as I use the term in this
article, marks the conditions in which the Sovereign invokes its ability to
withhold from a detainee the status of criminal defendant and to drape
bare life with a new garb, a new legal status and category-that of enemy
combatant.40  The Sovereign can instantiate this state of exception,
framed as a war on terror, with the associated authority to accomplish
indefinite detention by withholding one legal status (criminal defendant)
and replacing it with another (enemy combatant), because we the people
consent to it, demand it even, as part of our expectation that the
Sovereign, through the machinery of government, keep us safe.
The suspension of the criminal-justice process, and the expansion of
sovereign power through the state of exception, is a price we are called
upon to pay in the prosecution of this war. Actually, if we take
democracy seriously, the tenor of my use of the term, Sovereign, as if the
Sovereign were some actor in the world separate and apart from the
subjects who are beholden to it, should seem jarring. The People as
sovereign entity, rule-giver, and possessor of biopower, acts to protect
the security of the people (the population itself, the actual living
individuals who hear politicians speak sanctimoniously of "the People")
by segmenting a certain slice of the people (designated as "enemy
combatants" or "terrorists," or "sexual predator," or whatever category of
dangerousness inaugurated by the People) and decreeing them ineligible
for certain rights that are regarded as crucial ingredients in the identity of
the People. If we take democracy seriously, it would then be more
appropriate to say, without at all blushing, that this state of exception is a
price we have willed upon ourselves, a price worked out by, so we tell
ourselves, a re-calibration of the security-liberty balance. This re-
calibration is carried out for the benefit of the people within the branches
of our government that are, so we tell ourselves, an organ of the People,
in theory meaning, responsive to the will of the people. Congress and
the Executive struggle over that re-calibration, and though it may not be
elegant governmental activity, it is what our constitutional founders have
bequeathed us.
The judiciary has a role, too, in this story of democracy in action. It
engages in a different sort of calibration. It eschews this overt balancing
of security and liberty, being too skittish to second-guess the People's
decision to will upon itself a state of exception emanating from a
40. For the current legal definition of "enemy combatant," see Military
Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, creating 10 U.S.C. § 948a(1). For more
on the etiology of the term, see Williams, supra note 6, at n. 13.
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commitment to prosecute a war-even if it is a war unlike the wars we
heretofore have fought or have read about in history books. The
judiciary's calibration hones in on the mechanics of governance, the
hard-wiring of governmentality that we have inherited from 1789. 4 1 The
judiciary calibrates the allocation of power between the democratic
branches of the American state so that those branches may, consistent
with the rule of law, which could just as well be restated as consistent
with our Enlightenment heritage,42 re-calibrate the security-liberty
balance. The touchstone of the judiciary's calibration of this allocation
of power is some appropriate vision of limited government under law.43
The idea of limited government under law, which is the core feature of
our constitutional republic, owes its meaning, its force, and its very
existence to Enlightenment political philosophy.4 4 So, when the Court in
Hamdi struggles over this particular calibration-and the Court
splintered over it4 5-the Court is expressing our Enlightenment heritage
and its underlying vision of law as the manifestation of power. Let us
leave aside the irony that this expression of our Enlightenment heritage
leads to the suspension of the most vitalizing institutional embodiment of
that heritage-the criminal process rooted in trial by jury46-because the
more important focus for now should be on the myopic nature of the
Court's vision of limited government.
Hamdi reminds us that the constraints imposed on sovereign activity
by our fidelity to the idea of limited government concern the mechanics
of governmentality. 47 What we pursue as a nation, rather than simply
41. See Samuel Issacharoff & Richard H. Pildes, Between Civil Libertarianism and
Executive Unilateralism: An Institutional Process Approach to Rights During Wartime,
in THE CONSTITUTION IN WARTIME: BEYOND ALARMISM AND COMPLACENCY 162-81
(Mark Tushnet ed., 2005).
42. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 163 (1803) ("The government of the
United States has been emphatically termed a government of laws, and not of men.").
43. See Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Congressional Authorization and
the War on Terrorism, 118 HARV. L. REv. 2047, 2049 (2005) (noting the "outpouring of
academic literature raising concerns about Executive Branch unilateralism and, in
particular, about the absence of principled limits on Executive power to identify, target,
detain, and try terrorists").
44. Our twentieth century cultural practices, and their institutional embodiments, are
expressions of seventeenth and eighteenth century philosophical ideas. See generally
ALASDAIR MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE 36 et. seq. (2d ed. 1984) (1981).
45. See Williams, supra note 6, at 346-49 (discussing the plurality, concurrences and
dissents in Hamdi).
46. A key grievance against the King of England specified in the Declaration of
Independence was that "He has affected to render the Military independent of and
superior to the Civil Power" and "deprived us, in many Cases, of the Benefits of Trial by
Jury." THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 14, 20 (U.S. 1776).
47. For a full explication of the term governmentality, see Michel Foucault,
Governmentality, in MICHEL FOUCAULT, POWER 201, 219-20 (James D. Faubian, ed.
1994) [hereinafter FOUCAULT, POWER].
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what our government may pursue in its day-to-day operations to keep the
bureaucracy functioning, is beyond the constraining idea of limited
government, and thus beyond judicial purview.48 The idea of limited
government, and thus the judiciary's own power, doesn't extend to the
Sovereign's instantiation of the state of exception. But the juridical
mechanics of how the state machinery is used to detain individuals as
enemy combatants, as a defining feature of this state of exception, may
be, to some as yet unclear degree, within the limited-government
constraint and thus within the reviewing power of the courts.
What is troublesome with this picture-and what will herein be a
continuation of a theme introduced in After the Gold Rush, Part I-is
that the instantiation of the state of exception has become a technique of
governance deployed in a globalization environment embroiled in a war
of sorts that is unlike other "hot" wars we have experienced. It used to
be that a "hot" war called upon the total mobilization of a populace, but
no more, for this "war" depends on the acquiescence, or the passivity, of
we the people.49 So, when the judiciary begs off the task of imposing the
constitutional vision of limited government upon this particular
technique of governance, when it too becomes part of the passivity that
surrounds war-on-terror governmentality, it permits by omission what we
are witnessing as the bloating of sovereign power-indeed, the eruption
of a new kind of sovereignty. 50  One might say, then, that because
48. See Samuel Issacharoff& Richard H. Pildes, supra note 41at 161 (observing that
judiciary defers to security-liberty tradeoff made by legislative and executive branches).
Whether we as a nation shall fight the Germans and the Japanese was never a justiciable
question, but how the Sovereign may go about detaining American citizens who happen
to be of Japanese descent is a matter of govemmentality, or the valid operation of the
machinery of the state. It turned out, of course, that in Korematsu the idea of limited
government didn't have much traction. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214
(1944). Same here, with respect to the so-called war on terror-our current state of
exception-and the detention of so-called enemy combatants. See also Arar v. Ashcroft,
414 F.Supp. 2d 250, 283 (E.D.N.Y 2006) (officials who carry out extraordinary rendition
cannot be held liable without congressional approval of damage suits). Cf Schwarz,
supra note 10, at 47 ("[D]ebate[s] about a how a nation should conduct itself in a time of
crisis must be framed in terms of national values.").
49. The war on terror is similar to the Cold War in that it traffics in conceptual
simplicity-an us-against-them mentality-with us cast in the role of the noble heroes
pursuing all that is right and good in the world, and "them," whoever that might be, so
long as they are regarded as unvarnished evil with no coherent grievance. Like the Cold
War, the war on terror gets the American people-and the Supreme Court, too-off the
hook of actually trying to understand the world. Instead, opinions can be derived and
analysis can proceed from a simplistic ontology that essentially bloats state power in the
most crucial way, where the possibility of future human flourishing, if not human
survival, hangs in the balance.
50. See MICHAEL HARDT & ANTONIO NEGRI, MULTITUDE: WAR AND DEMOCRACY IN
THE AGE OF EMPIRE xii-xiii (2004); see also SCHWARZ, supra note 10, at 65 et. seq.
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"sovereignty emerges within the field of governmentality,"' Hamdi
mocks the very idea of our commitment to limited government under
law, which is the very foundation of our nation, and thus by extension
disavows a crucial feature of our Enlightenment heritage. This
disavowal is done in the name of preserving that heritage, or so we tell
ourselves.
There is what many might consider a comforting response to this
argument about bloated sovereignty. No suspension of law has taken
place, one might counter, and thus no retreat from our commitment to
limited government constrained by the rule of law. In fact, we can
applaud the Hamdi Court for boldly swatting down the Executive's
insistence that war silences law: "a state of war," Justice O'Connor
writes, "is not a blank check for the President when it comes to the rights
of the Nation's citizens. 52  More important, presumably, the
instantiation of the current state of exception, which is the nation's
commitment to prosecute a particular war against a technique deployed
by a worldwide network of individuals unaffiliated with any state, is a
matter of national will, and of national identity, that is reserved to we the
people. So long as we take seriously the idea of American democracy,
and so long as we believe that our democracy is working when it comes
to the exercise of sovereignty in matters of global management
(ubiquitously expressed in our political discourse as "spreading
democracy"), we really cannot regard ourselves as the civil-rights-and-
civil-liberties-losing victims of an overreaching Sovereign, because the
state of exception itself, which is the juridical order brought about by a
war on terror that we have democratically endorsed, is a product of our
self-willing through the organs of our democracy.5 3
I find comfort neither in this response, nor in this entire story of
democratic institutions re-calibrating the balance of security and liberty,
as if that balancing takes place in a world that is simply handed to us, and
is untouched by our own affirmative quests for domination and control
unshackled by international legality. This fraudulent neutrality of the
material setting in which the security-liberty balance is struck is the not-
so-deeply hidden backdrop of the Court's decision in Hamdi. Situating
Hamdi within a story of democracy is dubious not simply because the
"sovereign people, in its collective capacity, is everywhere and
51. BUTLER, supra note 38, at 53.
52. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 535-36 (2004).
53. "The law in a democracy matters because it reflects how the citizens choose to
define themselves and their relationship to history; how it is they explain themselves to
others. The law in a democracy is the citizen's means of communicating what type of
nation theirs is to be." Michael Hatfield, Legitimacy, Identity, Violence and the Law
(unpublished manuscript, used by permission).
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nowhere," a mythic symbol, as it were.54 It is not only that all such
legitimation theories are rooted in fictions, or that "civil society is a bluff
and the social contract a fairy tale."55  The dubiousness is more
empirical. What seems to be completely ignored in all the commentary
about Hamdi and the other post-9/1 1 cases relating to the so-called war
on terror is the rather stunning quiescence toward the real possibility that
the United States, with its desiccated public sphere, has become "a
military empire. 56 It is that quiescence, and the troubling circumstances
surrounding it, that makes it so dubious to situate Hamdi in a storyline of
democracy in action.
III. The Political Dream of Guantanamo
A central fact in Hamdi, if not the central fact, is the act of
detention: a person is being confined, caged, and prevented from moving
about freely.57 Secondarily to that fact is the asserted purpose behind
that act of detention-namely, the averting of danger that the confined
person poses to others. 58 Detention, then, is a tool, and the use of that
tool is, to some degree and in some manner, regulated by law. But what
is the relationship of the tool and the law that supposedly regulates its
use?
To consider that relationship, as was done in After the Gold Rush,
Part I, I wish to borrow from Martin Heidegger's illustrative use of the
hammer as a tool in Being and Time.59 Heidegger observes that human
beings exist as beings-in-the-world, meaning we are thrown into it; we
find ourselves in a certain time and living under certain limiting
circumstances that are not of our own making or choosing.60  But as
beings-in-the-world we have no choice, should we choose to live out a
life, to do other than pursue projects.6' We have no choice, one might
say, but to choose how we will reveal our own being as we move
towards death.62 In that act of choosing, the environment in which we
live (the world) consists of tools and instruments that we use to give
54. DICK HOWARD, THE SPECTER OF DEMOCRACY 212 (2002).
55. FOUCAULT, POWER, supra note 47, at xxxi.
56. CHALMERS JOHNSON, THE SORROWS OF EMPIRE: MILITARISM, SECRECY, AND THE
END OF THE REPUBLIC 22 (2004); see also HARDT & NEGRI, supra note 50.
57. See Williams, supra note 6, at 397 (discussing the actual situation of Yasser
Hamdi as an incarcerated individual, and how his situation is reduced to an incidental
backdrop to the legal issues in the case).
58. Id. at 397-405.
59. HEIDEGGER, supra note 7.
60. Id. at 68-69, 78-90.
61. Id. at 105-07.
62. Id. at 296-97.
[Vol. 113:1
AFTER THE GOLD RUSH
substance to our choosing.63 In that sense, our being is constituted by the
world and the world is constituted by the myriad acts of choosing that
take place every minute of every day.64
A hammer, we all know, is a tool. We also know its paradigmatic
function-to bang in nails, or more generally, to strike other objects.
Similarly, we presume to know the paradigmatic function of detention-
as-tool-to incapacitate by confining. Heidegger insists on going deeper
by distinguishing between an understanding of the hammer as a tool that
is "on hand" and the hammer as a tool that is "at hand., 65 The hammer
that happens to be "on hand" is inert, a thing lying there with a wood
handle and iron head, having a specific measurable dimension and
weight 66 A hammer that is "at hand" is one that is being used-by a
carpenter, say, who is building a cabinet. Our understanding of this thing
we call a hammer is revealed by how it is being used. Its size and weight
become more than just descriptive ingredients of the thing, but instead
are matters of concern (is the hammer big enough for the job? is it too
heavy?) We come to know the hammer more intimately in its "at hand"
sense than we do in its "on hand" sense. We come to know the hammer
through the medium of our chosen projects and engagements within a
world that is constantly in the making by virtue of those projects and
engagements.67
What After the Gold Rush, Part I suggests is that Justice O'Connor
in Hamdi treats detention-as-tool in the "on-hand" sense, as merely a
thing that exists in society's toolkit for dealing with dangerousness.
68
"Detention" as an "on hand" tool is a thing to be classified: is the
detention at issue more in the nature of a civil commitment or a criminal
punishment? Is it administrative or punitive? Much intellectual energy
is devoted to making that classification, with no meaningful regard to
understanding who is doing the detaining-who used in the widest sense
of the term as, namely, this nation with a particular geopolitical aim (as if
we can understand a hammer without understanding its use by a
carpenter to build a cabinet or a house).
What the Heideggerian hammer suggests is that the more probing
way of understanding detention is to treat it as an "at hand" tool, or an
instrument used by a particular being (in this case, a nation) to pursue a
set of aims (a being acting with intention), beyond the shallow aim of
incapacitation. Detention as a tool that is "at hand" in the so-called war
63. Id. at 97-122, 135-48.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 98, 190-95.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Williams, supra note 6, at 377 et. seq.
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on terror cannot be adequately understood by examining it as if it were
just something "on hand," as merely some thing that exists in a legal
system's toolkit to defend against "danger" or to vindicate some notion
of retribution. Examining it that way, and thus analytically focusing on
how to classify the act of detention (is it civil commitment or
punishment?)-a formal, dryly analytically exercise-obscures the truly
urgent question, what exactly is this "tool" being used to accomplish
geopolitically? It is either naive or an act of bad faith to suggest that
Guantanamo detention is not a geopolitical tool of some kind. But what
sort of geopolitical tool it is, and what sort of geopolitical aim is being
sought through that tool, is entirely removed from the Hamdi analysis, as
it is from the war-on-terror jurisprudence generally. These questions are
not addressed because Hamdi analyses detention as an "on hand" thing
rather than an "at hand" tool.
My project endeavors to create space for an analysis that treats
Guantanamo detention as an "at hand" tool in this so-called war on
terror. The spirit of that project rejects fundamentally the implicit image
of Guantanamo detention as something that is simply inserted into the
world, presumably out of a claimed necessity; Guantanamo detention is a
representation of a social consciousness, exemplifying and acquiring its
meaning and function from ideas and cultural forces that exist in the
world, just as its existence ineluctably remakes the world. We cannot
understand what it is that Hamdi was really deciding-that is, what is
really at issue in that and other detention cases-without engaging in a
Heideggerian "at hand" analysis of Guantanamo detention.
A. Foucault's Disciplinary Society
Civil commitment cases remind us of the ever-present temptation-
identified by Foucault as emerging into view in the nineteenth
century 69-to bypass the obstacle course of criminal procedure in favor
of the more streamlined approach that administrative processes allow.
That we so often resist the impulse to dispense with the criminal process
as the paradigm for detaining the dangerous raises the question whether
we do so because we doubt our ability to accurately classify who is and
who is not dangerous without the regime of rights associated with the
69. Michel Foucault, About the Concept of the "Dangerous Individual in Nineteenth
Century Legal Psychiatry," in FOUCAULT, POWER, supra note 47, at 198-99 ("In the
course of [the Nineteenth Century], penal law did not evolve from an ethic of freedom to
a science of psychic determinism; rather, it enlarged, organized, and codified the
suspicion and the locating of dangerous individuals .. "); id. at 200 ("Only insidiously,
slowly, and, as it were, from below and fragmentally, has a system of sanctions based on
what one is been taking shape. It has taken nearly one hundred years for the notion of
'dangerous individual' .. . to be accepted in judicial thought.").
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criminal process, or because we remain fundamentally wedded to certain
aspirations that only the obstacle course of the criminal process can
vindicate. As much as we crave security, perhaps our need to impose
moral blame is too resilient for us to capitulate too easily to the simplistic
public-health-related administrative goal of detaining the dangerous. If
we cling to our criminal adjudicatory process as the paradigm mode of
determining who to detain, because there is a deep psychic need to
express blame and to morally condemn, then our equally deep cultural
aspiration, rooted in our Enlightenment heritage, to morally legitimate
the condemnation in some Kantian fashion cannot be bypassed without
provoking deep cultural and intellectual angst.
In Discipline and Punish, Foucault devotes a crucial chapter to what
he calls "panopticism," which is an idealization derived from an
architectural surveillance mechanism conjured up by Jeremy Bentham
and called a Panoptican. 70 The chapter opens, not with a description and
discussion of the Panoptican, but with a narration of "the measures to be
taken when the plague appeared in a town. '71 Foucault portrays a town
that has become an enclosed, segmented space where the populace is
constantly under observation: individuals "inserted in a fixed place" and
their movements supervised, events recorded, and authority and power
hierarchized. 7'2  The town is a "compact model of the disciplinary
mechanism"-a mechanism of subjecting individual bodies to training,
coercion, molding, and mobilization-inasmuch as "each individual is
constantly located, examined and distributed among the living beings,
the sick and the dead., 73 What the plague brings about, on this narration,
is the perfection of social ordering, the solidifying of the disciplinary
ideal, which Foucault says is the hidden "political dream of the plague":
"[T]here was also a political dream of the plague, which [involves] ...
strict divisions; ... [and] the penetration of regulation into even the
smallest details of everyday life through the mediation of the complete
hierarchy that assured the capillary function of power.,
7 4
70. Here's Foucault's description:
[A]t the periphery, an annular building; at the centre, a tower; this tower is
pierced with wide windows that open onto the inner side of the ring; the
peripheric building is divided into cells, each of which extends the whole width
of the building; they have two windows, one on the inside, corresponding to the
windows of the tower; the other, on the outside, allows the light to cross the
cell from one end to the other.
FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH, supra note 2, at 200. One person within the central
tower is thus in a position to observe, without detection, any one of the inhabitants of the
cells in the peripheric building.
71. Id. at 195.
72. Id. at 197.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 197-98.
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Apart from the political dream of the plague, Foucault identifies a
separate phenomenon, which he introduces and analyzes in his first book,
Madness and Civilization.75 This phenomenon involves the development
of rituals of exclusion, starting with societal mechanisms of confining
lepers and then later confining the socially useless (vagabonds, beggars,
criminals, imbeciles, the insane); and later still, the refinement of the
rituals of exclusion to isolate the "mad" as peculiarly in need of
separation from the so-called "normal" society.76 The political dream of
confining lepers and of the entire enterprise of exclusion, Foucault says,
is "that of a pure community," and consists of naturalizing the
"normal. 77 That political dream of naturalizing the "normal" differs
from the political dream of the plague, as the latter consists of the dream
of a "disciplined society" where the "normal" is not merely naturalized,
but where individuals are molded into "normal" subjects, and where
"normalization" takes place through disbursed networks of power.78
What is crucial for present purposes is not the details of Foucault's
conception of "discipline," but the convergence of these two political
dreams, where disciplinary mechanisms came to be applied with special
force to spaces devoted to exclusion-i.e., places of confinement.79
Bentham's Panoptican epitomizes this convergence of the two political
dreams, for it epitomizes "the existence of a whole set of techniques and
institutions for measuring, supervising and correcting the abnormal,"
which in turn "brings into play the disciplinary mechanisms to which the
fear of the plague gave rise.
'80
What we may find useful to consider is the political dream of
Guantanamo, already strongly evoked in After the Gold Rush, Part I as
emblematic of the deep Enlightenment drive to control and dominate.
81
That political dream partakes in a pax Americana vision of globalization,
with gold-rush American exceptionalism at the core of a resurgent
sovereignty akin to that which existed pre-Enlightenment.82 What
75. FOUCAULT, MADNESS AND CIVILIZATION 38-64 (Richard Howard trans., Vintage
Books 1988) (1965).
76. Id.
77. FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH, supra note 2, at 198-99.
78. Id. at 199.
79. Foucault describes this convergence nicely: "On the one hand, the lepers are
treated as plague victims; the tactics of individualizing disciplines are imposed on the
excluded; and, on the other hand, the universality of disciplinary controls makes it
possible to brand the 'leper' and to bring into play against him the dualistic mechanisms
of exclusion." Id.
80. Id.
81. Williams, supra note 6, at 417-23.
82. Here is one articulation of the post-Cold War political dream, by two Bush
Administration insiders, White House speechwriter David Frum and Defense Department
official Richard Perle: "A world at peace; a world governed by law; a world in which all
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Foucault's work inspires is a corollary insight: Guantanamo Bay puts in
place, as a present day reality, the entwining political dreams of the
plague and of the leper. What lies behind Guantanamo-style detention,
we might say, is the "haunting memory of 'contagions,' of the plague, of
rebellions, crimes, vagabondage, desertions, people who appear and
disappear, live and die in disorder." 83  For what is this geo-political
phenomenon we call "the Jihadi terrorist," but the grandiose and
frightening expression of all these things, which must be excluded in
every conceivable way and vanquished for the sake of society's well-
being? What is Hamdi but a juridical expression of administrative
necessity suitably veiled by administrative decency? Hence, the sound
and fury of the legal issue boils down to, at the hands of the Hamdi
Court, a mechanical application of Matthews v. Eldridge,84 and a
roadmap of due process compliance to bureaucratic decisionmaking,
arising from the sovereign's quest to exclude the quintessence of
dangerousness-ideologically and religiously driven human missiles of
destruction. What Hamdi reflects, then, is the larger cultural tendency to
define practical problems as technical issues requiring technicians and
experts (notably, so-called "foreign policy experts") rather than
occasions for societal self-reflection.
85
The ensuing discussion offers the following view: the war on terror
started as spectacle, most notably, though not exclusively, through
spectacular bombings aired with much fanfare on CNN and other news
outlets, in Afghanistan and Iraq, and through leaked photographs of
abject hooded detainees at Guantanamo; then, through the insistence
upon administrative decency couched as due process in Hamdi,86 the war
on terror is evolving into a form of disciplinary power that Foucault
captures in his discussion of the town combating the plague. The
political dream of the plague is the dream of the perfectly administered
society, and it percolates in the Western rational mind with great
vividness because the evil that the town combats presents itself in a
peoples are free to find their own destinies: That dream has not yet come true, it will not
come true soon, but if it ever does come true, it will be brought into being by American
armed might and defended by American armed might, too." DAVID FRUM & RICHARD
PERLE, AN END TO EVIL: HOW TO WIN THE WAR ON TERROR 279 (2003).
83. FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH, supra note 2, at 198.
84. 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
85. See, e.g., JURGEN HABERMAS, TOWARDS A RATIONAL SOCIETY 102-03 (J. Shapiro
trans., 1971). Habermas warns against the ever enlarging range of issues removed from
political debate and the treatment of those issues as technical problems best resolved by
"experts." Id. Like Foucault, Habermas sees the trend in society towards an orientation
that puts a premium on the "avoidance of risks and the eradication of the dangers to the
system." DAVID HELD, INTRODUCTION TO CRITICAL THEORY: HORKHEIMER TO HABERMAS
264 (1980).
86. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 534-35 (2004).
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simple dualism of life and death. 87 Within the urgency of this life-and-
death struggle, the town devises mechanisms of social control and order
(i.e., disciplinary mechanisms) to combat the evil of the plague.88 The
political dream of Guantanamo is that same dream-the perfectly
administered, highly rationalistic, society-and that dream, which hovers
over Justice O'Connor's deployment in Hamdi of the due-process
architecture of Matthews v. Eldridge,89 percolates again in our culture's
consciousness and expresses itself juridically because we confront a life-
and-death struggle akin to that of the town's confrontation with the
plague.
B. An MMDI World
The legal academy has dreamt the Foucaultian dream of the
plague.90 Consider Professor Albert Alschuler's scenario. Imagine the
development of a psychological test that accurately assesses
dangerousness. Alschuler calls this an MMDI diagnostic test.91 The
state legislature requires everyone to take the MMDI and establishes a
suitably high threshold score for the administrative detention of the
intrinsically dangerous, a score that leaves very little doubt about the
dangerous proclivities of the test-taker.92 The MMDI fulfills the dream
of near-perfect preemption against dangerous individuals. We balk at
this dream because in our waking hours we resist dispensing with the act-
status distinction. The civil-criminal dichotomy rests upon this
distinction, and with it, our best efforts at regulating state power over the
individual.93
In Hamdi, the act-status distinction has been transmogrified from a
shield against penal detention based strictly on dangerousness (i.e.,
status), into a sword wielded by the Sovereign to bypass the criminal-
process regime of rights. Hamdi presents the latest exemplar of the
Sovereign exploiting the act-status distinction to address directly, outside
the rights-regime associated with constitutional criminal procedure, the
87. FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH, supra note 2, at 198.
88. Id. at 199.
89. Matthews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
90. Albert W. Alschuler, Preventive Pretrial Detention and the Failure of Interest-
balancing Approaches to Due Process, 85 MICH. L. REv. 510, 535 (1986).
91. Alschuler conjures up the fictional Menninger University as the site for the
development of the Menninger Multiphasic Dangerousness Inventory test. Id.
92. Id.
93. See, e.g., Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962) (criminalizing status of
narcotics addiction held unconstitutional). See generally Alschuler, supra note 90, at 552
("An insistence on proof of past misconduct shaped the common law's rules of detention
as well as its definitions of crime.").
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issue of dangerousness.94 Yaser Hamdi's portrayal in O'Connor's
storyline as a character who is acted upon and never genuinely acts, or an
agent-less character, fits the juridical ambition of putting the case in the
civil-commitment category and aids the narrative ambition of avoiding a
confrontation with the reality of the ever-present temptation to bypass the
cumbersome processes associated with criminal adjudication.95 Hamdi is
simply not a case of culpable acts because whatever culpable acts Yaser
Hamdi committed-acts replete with geopolitical significance-have
been airbrushed out of the narrative by choice, but not by any intrinsic
logic. 96 Once that narrative goal has been accomplished, thus putting this
case in the civil-commitment category, the conclusion seems analytically
defensible that some meager menu of legal rights that accommodates
individual and governmental interests suffices under the Constitution.
The conclusion is more than just defensible, but actually is the height of
nobility: "Because we live in a society in which '[m]ere public
intolerance or animosity cannot constitutionally justify the deprivation of
a person's physical liberty,' . . . our [constitutional analysis] is unaltered
by the allegations surrounding the particular detainee or the
organizations with which he is alleged to have associated., 97 Tolerance
is thus deployed to reduce the legal controversy to the more prosaic
question of how much process is due, rather than whether, and at what
cost, Mr. Hamdi should be banished from the accepted regime of rights
guaranteed to criminal defendants. After all, there must be thresholds of
tolerance, and so, in this "war on terror," we must focus on whether you
are with us or against us.98
94. See Kansas v. Crane, 534 U.S. 407 (2002); Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346
(1997); United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739 (1987); Moyer v. Peabody, 212 U.S. 78
(1909). The Court, of course, hinted that terrorism might put the exclamation point on
this line of authority. See Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 696 (2001) (leaving open the
possibility that "terrorism" might justify "forms of preventive detention" for which the
judiciary would have to give "heightened deference to the judgments of the political
branches with respect to matters of national security").
95. See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004).
96. See id.
97. Id. at 531.
98. Here we see evidence of what Derrida identified as objectionable in the notion of
tolerance. It is a word with religious roots, deployed most often by "those with power,
always as a kind of condescending concession." GIOVANNA BORRADORI, PHILOSOPHY IN
A TIME OF TERROR: DIALOGUES WITH JURGEN HABERMAS AND JACQUES DERRIDA 127
(2003). To Derrida, tolerance is a way of limiting one's welcome, a way of
"maintain[ing] control over the limits of my 'home,' my sovereignty, my 'I can' (my
territory, my house, my language, my culture, my religion, and so on)." Id. at 127-28.
And so it is an attribute of sovereignty, "the good face of sovereignty, which says to the
other from its elevated position, I am letting you be... but do not forget that this is my
home." Id. at 127.
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Hamdi, then, fits within a narrative that bespeaks a willingness to
flirt with what I will here simply call an MMDI world, a world where the
administrative determination of dangerousness is the primary good
within detention jurisprudence, a world where, to quote Foucault's
prescient observation, the juridical task "will be to reduce as much as
possible-either by elimination, or by exclusion or by various
restrictions, or by therapeutic measures-the risk of criminality
represented by the individual in question." 99  Foucault's observations
about the nineteenth century European mindset, that "criminality"
evolved into a concept with "risk" of dangerousness at its core,100 is
valuable here because it reinforces the overarching thesis that 9/11 did
not so much usher in something new, but unleashed cultural forces that
were circulating within Western culture and consciousness for hundreds
of years. On this view, understanding Islamic terrorists as human
missiles of destruction, akin to lepers or carriers of the plague, is
essentially the unleashing of the nineteenth century mindset of "the
criminal [as] the social enemy."''
The desire to use penal sanctions in the way that the Executive
wishes to use enemy-combatant detentions and military commissions is
very much a nineteenth century phenomenon, where juridical practices
groped towards a coherent articulation of the "intrinsically dangerous"
individual. 102 "The entire penal regime of the nineteenth century became
a control not so much over what individuals did-was it lawful or
unlawful?-as over what they might do, what they were capable of
doing, what they were liable to do, [and] what they were imminently
about to do., 10 3  The administrative design of enemy-combatant
detention sanctioned by Hamdi is predicated on the judgment of an
individual's potentialities, a juridical practice that, Foucault argues,
characterizes many of our key institutions far beyond the courthouse,
such as schools, hospitals, and prisons.10 4 This idea probably explains
why one might balk at the wisdom of a policy to use Guantanamo-style
detention, but at the same time not react in disbelief that such a practice
99. FOUCAULT, POWER, supra note 47, at 198.
100. Id. at 197.
101. MICHEL FOUCAULT, Truth and Juridical Forms, in POWER, supra note 47, at 1,
54. Associating dangerousness with disease also characterized the confinement of the
insane, which ensued after the confinement of lepers waned after the Middle Ages. See
FOUCAULT, MADNESS AND CIVILIZATION, supra note 75, at 205 (Richard Howard trans.,
Vintage Books de. 1988) (1965) ("Long before the problem of discovering to what
degree the unreasonable is pathological was formulated, there had formed, in the space of
confinement and by an alchemy peculiar to it, a melange combining the dread of
unreason and the old specters of disease.").
102. FOUCAULT, POWER, supra note 47, at 198.
103. Id. at 56-57.
104. See FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH, supra note 2, at 293-308.
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would even be conceivable. Hamdi presents a more intensive instance of
such judgment, but there is nothing qualitatively different in the
sovereignty expressed in enemy-combatant detention from what
routinely happens in our disciplinary society. Hamdi is, in short, a
fruition of an impulse that Foucault identified as salient some two
hundred years ago.
The structures of exclusion, through which the Western impetus to
detain and confine expresses itself, developed during the Middle Ages
with the confinement of lepers, and then when that perceived danger
abated, those same structures, having lain dormant, resurrected to confine
those considered mad.10 5 Guantanamo-style detention, I suggest, exists
within this Western tradition. More than that, Guantanamo-style
detention perhaps reflects the potency of the sovereign's "biopower," a
power over life, the administration of bodies and the rationalistic
management of life, as opposed to merely a power to inflict death.
116
Consider what Foucault suggests about capital punishment, that it is less
about the sovereign's power to kill than it is about biopower: "[C]apital
punishment could not be maintained except by invoking less the
enormity of the crime itself than the monstrosity of the criminal, his
incorrigibility, and the safeguard of society. One had the right to kill
those who represented a kind of biological danger to others."'10 7 Does
this not also hold true for how we seek to dispatch so-called Islamic
terrorists? Is not the resurgent sovereignty at the heart of Hamdi
rationalized and juridically managed in terms of this biopower? As we
shall see later in this article, Hamdi exemplifies a means-ends style of
reasoning suitable for a jurisprudence ensconced in an administrative
state. It is therefore worth observing, pace Foucault, that with the advent
of biopower as a feature of social life and governmentality, "law operates
more and more as a norm, and that the judicial institution is increasingly
incorporated into a continuum of apparatuses (medical, administrative,
and so on) whose functions are for the most part regulatory."'10 8 That is,
law operates tactically within regimes of administrative control,
Guantanamo detention being the most intensive manifestation of this
fact.
Every act of judicial decision-making forges legal meaning, and the
way that legal meaning is forged depends on the genuine commitment to
some vision of a future reality, a "teleologic vision."10 9 With the advent
105. See FOUCAULT, MADNESS AND CIVILIZATION, supra note 75, at 204-05.
106. FOUCAULT, SEXUALITY supra note 10, at 140.
107. Id. at 138.
108. Id. at 144.
109. Robert Cover, Forward. Nomos and Narrative, 97 HARV. L. REV. 4, 45 (1983).
This commitment is quite real, no matter how dense the legal rhetoric may be to obscure
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of "enemy combatants" as a legal category, 1 ° judges are tempted to
commit themselves to a regulatory world where people are detained
because they are looked upon as irredeemably dangerous-dangerous not
for medical reasons, but for ideological reasons. That world to which
such a commitment is made itself implies at least two secondary
commitments, one relating to the commitment to the normal due-process
regime for adjudicating criminal behavior, and another to a belief that
whatever role our nation has played, and may still play, in producing the
geopolitical frame that fosters the production of such dangerous
individuals, that role is legitimate. The weaker the first, the less salient
the second one must be.' 1
So, the expansion of sovereignty through a state of exception is not
calculated to suspend law for its own sake. The criminal process as a
regime of law, or as a form of legality, is suspended to create an anomic
space for the Sovereign's construction of another regime of legality, and
the effect of filling that anomic space with a new regime of legality (a
new paradigm, if you will) is to limit the reach of the existing criminal-
process paradigm. What we get, ultimately, is a law of detention, with
several branches all regulating the calculated management of life
(biopower); the criminal process is but one branch of the jurisprudence
of detention, perhaps eventually not even its most important, but merely
the backdrop or starting point for understanding the law of detention, in
much the way contract law is the starting point for understanding a whole
host of specialized subjects, ranging from labor law to sports law to
it. Robert Cover speaks of the judge who must "choose between affirming his
interpretation of the official law through violence against [authentic] protesters" who are
committed to their own interpretation of the law. For the judge, the commitment entailed
in enforcing her own interpretation of the law is "tested" by the naked fact that she is
"part of the bridge that links the official vision of the [law] with the reality of people in
jail." Id. at 48.
110. For the etiology of the term, "enemy combatant," see Williams, supra note 6, at
346-47 n.15.
111. A bit more about the second commitment: Political resistance, whether it be
from Al Qaeda or Eighteenth Century American colonialists, must occur through the
articulation of reasons for the resistance. Those reasons may be outrageous or
compelling, but they exist nonetheless as real things that give meaning to the
commitment that is implied by the creation and enforcement of a particular doctrinal
legal regime. It may be true that our nation is gripped by this "difficult time" as innocent
victim and that Islamic fundamentalists are engaged in their own fanatical resistance
struggle that warrants no serious intellectual attention. True or not, this view is a
commitment to a particular vision of the world, and the creation and enforcement of the
legal category of "enemy combatant" is part of the bridge that leads us from our present
to that future. See Cover, supra note 109, at 45; see also BUTLER, supra note 38, at 92
(observing that our so-called war on terror is "transformed into a reality indefinitely
extended into the future, controlling not only the lives of prisoners and the fate of
constitutional and international law, but also the very ways in which the future may or
may not be thought").
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landlord-tenant law to insurance law, etc. In the state of exception, the
new paradigm suspends the old paradigm to vindicate the norm that
animates the old paradigm. An enemy-combatant detention system (the
new paradigm)-captured in the reality and idea of Guantanamo-
displaces the criminal process (the old paradigm) to vindicate the norm
of providing security because the old paradigm of the criminal process is
not up to the task of vindicating that norm. In fact, the norm assumes its
greatest intensity within the juridical vacuum created by the state of
exception, thus making the need for displacement of the old paradigm
seem undeniable.' 1 2 The displacement happens not outside of law, but
within the juridical order, in this instance by eliminating the limiting
principle in criminal justice that cases like Robinson v. California
exemplify-namely, the analytical importance of the criminal act.
113
Consider this remark, a typical sentiment, made by a member of the
9/11 Commission: "To put the matter in its simplest terms, the potential
harm is so great that we can no longer wait until a crime is committed
before responding."'"14  We see here what Agamben identifies as
generally true in cases where a state of exception has been installed: we
realize the norm (public safety) by suspending the application of the
original paradigm that exists to vindicate the norm (the criminal
adjudicatory process, with its emphasis on the act-status distinction)." 5
"That is, the state of exception separates the norm from its application in
order to make its application possible. It introduces a zone of anomie
into the law in order to make the effective regulation ... of the real
possible." ' 16 In the state of exception, the norm (security) is enforced
even though the law (the criminal process) is suspended. Hamdi thus
presents itself as Legality's effort to save itself, an exceptional and
temporary effort to navigate this "difficult time" to restore viability of
the normal paradigm. Legality contains within itself a form of anti-
Legality, a device to create a vacuum within Legality, within the juridical
order that must not have a vacuum, in order to save itself against an
external threat.
112. "On the one hand, the juridical void at issue in the state of exceptions seems
absolutely unthinkable for the law; on the other, this unthinkable thing nevertheless has a
decisive strategic relevance for the juridical order and must not be allowed to slip away at
any cost." GIORGIO AGAMBEN, STATE OF EXCEPTION 51 (Kevin Attell, trans., Univ. of
Chi. Press 2005).
113. See Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962); see generally HERBERT L.
PACKER, THE LiMITS OF THE CRIMINAL SANCTION 73-79 (Stanford University Press 1968).
114. John L. Farmer, The Rule of Law in an Age of Terror, 57 RUTGERs L. REv. 747,
756 (2004).
115. See AGAMBEN, supra note 112, at 36.
116. Id. at 36: see also id. at 40.
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IV. Kant's Dream of Universalism and Weber's Nightmare of the Iron
Cage
September eleventh exposes a key duality in our culture: Kant's
dream of universalism and Weber's nightmare of instrumentalist
obsession.
The culmination of classical Enlightenment philosophy can be
associated with Kant, the philosopher who most rigorously severed
humanity from the yoke of blind obedience to authority by locating the
source of all authority in the rationality of the individual."' l That
rationality is the locus of personhood, and thus the locus of classical
liberal Western human-rights discourse. For that rationality to carry the
load that Kant places on it, the public sphere itself must foster it.
Democracy and the Enlightenment go hand in hand in that respect:
democracy is both the means for promoting the sort of autonomy and
rationality that the Kantian tradition validates and the end result of a
culture that commits itself to the Enlightenment project.
But within the promise of the Enlightenment heritage, a cancer
lurks, ready to metastasize and destroy its host. Max Weber understood
all too well the acute power of the Enlightenment's valorization of
rationality; he understood how rationality could unleash a surge in
technological and scientific achievements; and he understood the dark
impulses upon which rationality, and the seductiveness of rationality,
feeds itself.118  One philosopher summarizes Weber's critique of
modernity in a way that meshes well with a key theme presented here,
that what promotes the so-called war on terror is our Western obsession
to control and dominate:
[The disenchantment of the world] leaves the human subject alone: as
all ideals of cosmic harmony are dispelled, the world comes to be
perceived as an external object to be used for utilitarian ends.
Disenchantment is thus the breeding ground for an instrumental
conception of rationality.... Reason, understood [in terms of means
and ends], represents the pure and simple promotion of control-the
control of human beings over the world and of the individual human
being over others.
119
117. See, e.g., IMMANUEL KANT, GROUNDWORK OF THE METAPHYSIC OF MORALS 98-
109 (H.J. Paton trans., Harper & Row 1964); M. HORKHEIMER & T. ADORNO, DIALECTIC
OF ENLIGHTENMENT 81 (J. Cumming trans., 1972).
118. See HORKHEIMER & ADORNO, supra note 119, at 4-42, 81-119; HELD, supra note
85, at 65-66, 264.
119. BORRADORI, supra note 98, at 69-70.
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To understand how Kant and Weber play into the hidden forces
swirling within Hamdi, we must first grasp the Kantian roots of our
criminal adjudicatory process.
A. Our Criminal Adjudicatory Process as the Vitalizing Expression of
Our Enlightenment Heritage
What, if anything, makes a criminal trial different from an
administrative fact-finding tribunal? 20  Addressing that question
illuminates why the greatest expression of the Enlightenment ideal
within the Kantian tradition is the criminal trial. It is where the ideal is
most fully vitalized and where it is most forcefully put to the test.
We must immediately dispense with the view that a "trial" has some
unitary, fixed meaning. As Judith Shklar observed long ago, "[a] trial,
the supreme legalistic act, like all political acts, does not take place in a
vacuum. ' 121 One's understanding of the term must take into account
how the juridical practice of putting someone on "trial" fits within a
"whole complex of other institutions, habits, and beliefs," for a "trial
within a constitutional government is not like a trial in a state of near-
anarchy, or in a totalitarian order."1 22 I use the term here to refer to a
juridical practice that takes place within a democratic culture that, at the
institutional level, has been shaped by, and takes seriously, our
Enlightenment heritage.
A consequentialist understanding of the criminal trial, with its focus
on efficiently and reliably convicting the guilty, collapses the distinction:
the instrumentalist justification treats the criminal trial as simply one
embodiment of a fact-finding tribunal. The instrumentalist justification
has a powerful gravitational pull in constitutional criminal procedure, for
there is a constant tug in criminal-procedure doctrine to pursue
administrative efficiency, which usually means curtailing the "rights" of
the accused on the ground that those "rights" offer little payoff in terms
of reliability and are too luxurious when security is our predominant
concern. I put rights in quotes because the payoff for recognizing
them-their cash value, so to speak-is ultimately what determines
whether those "rights" actually exist as rights. This instrumentalist
gravitational pull, however, struggles against a heavy anchor that grips
our cultural soil. That anchor-in-the-soil is the word guilty.
A finding of guilt, rather than, say, factual responsibility, speaks to
us in a language that resists the pull of instrumentalist reasoning. The
120. R.A. DUFF, TRIALS AND PUNISHMENTS 33 (Cambridge University Press 1986).
121. JUDITH SHKLAR, LEGALISM: LAW, MORALS, AND POLITICAL TRIALS 144 (Harvard
University Press 2d ed. 1984) (1964).
122. Id.
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announcement of guilt is not merely an epistemological claim, a claim of
knowledge about what the accused has done; it is, more vitally, a moral
statement, a condemnation, and an ontological categorization whereby
the presumptively innocent accused becomes the convicted felon who
must now undergo a penitential hegira (or, in rare cases, death). A
criminal trial is fundamentally different from an administrative fact-
finding tribunal because what is expressed in a criminal trial is moral
blame, and the state violence inflicted on the convicted felon arising
from this moral blame requires a deeper form of justification than that
required when mere fact-finding is the pursuit. Moral blame requires
moral justification, and that moral justification must be built on the moral
foundation that minimally respects the accused as a human being.
Criminal adjudication differs from other modes of social control that rest
on administrative or managerial motivations precisely in this outlook that
we must have regarding the accused-that he must be accorded the
moral status of a person.1 23  It is here, at the base of the moral
architecture for our criminal adjudicatory process, that the Enlightenment
ideals-the ideals of modernity, we might say-come into focus,
thosesame ideals that are under assault in "this difficult time in our
Nation's history."
1 24
No criminal trial is legitimate in our system of justice, no matter
how accurate the outcome, without the participation of the accused in the
process that may ultimately condemn him.125 That fact, in and of itself,
reveals that internal to the very idea of a criminal trial is the
understanding that it demands communication, rational argument and
persuasion, not merely about the accused, but to the accused. "[T]he
very meaning of the trial... [entails] a process of argument and
judgment which is meant to be conducted with the defendant; a process
which respects and addresses him as a rational and responsible agent
who can be called to answer for his actions."
1 26
123. DUFF, supra note 120, at 47, 97, 126.
124. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 509 (2004); see also BORRADORI, supra note
98, at 14 ("The explicit ideology of the terrorists who attacked the Twin Towers and the
Pentagon on 9/11 is a rejection of the kind of modernity and secularization that in the
philosophical tradition is associated with the concept of Enlightenment.").
125. The accused may, of course, refuse to participate, or through obstreperous
behavior forfeit the right to participate, but that refusal or forfeiture is itself a form of
participation in that the accused's refusal or forfeiture manifests a choice on how to
involve himself in the proceedings. The fact-finding tribunal may welcome the
participation of the person who may be the target of the inquiry, but that participation is
predominantly instrumental, for it is welcomed precisely to the extent that it enhances the
tribunal's pursuit of an accurate outcome.
126. DUFF, supra note 120, at 35.
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This "answerability" thesis-that the accused must be addressed "as
a rational and responsible agent who can be called to answer ' 127 the
charges-produces an adjudicatory process dedicated to engagement
with the accused in a particular communicative endeavor, one rooted in
the Kantian vision of the human being entitled to participate in rational
discourse and argument. 128 So, when we say that an accused is entitled
to a trial, we are saying that the accused must be treated in a particular
non-instrumentalist way, or in a way that respects his autonomy as a
rational and responsible agent, worthy of communicative exchange. 129
An instrumentalist vision of the trial, where the consequentialist
focus on accurate outcomes predominates, does not justify adjudication
by the quality of the communication between the collective and the
accused; nor does it concern itself with the morally problematic act of
coercing an autonomous individual, for the coercion is itself justified by
the utilitarian calculus that punishment produces an improved state of
affairs. But adjudication built on Kantian universalism puts the problem
of coercion center stage.
An adjudicatory system dedicated principally to the epistemic
function of disentangling the guilty from the innocent for the sake of
promoting communal security necessarily rests upon coercion.130  A
prison sentence is enforced against the individual's will for the sake of
the common good: the criminal offender is forcibly removed from the
community and coerced into living in a prison because we are all better
off with that person in prison. Making sure that no innocent persons are
coerced in this way for the sake of the common good is the most
compelling side constraint to this system, and so the adjudicatory process
implements accuracy-promoting devices to give us confidence that a
guilty verdict is a valid claim to knowledge about the offender's
127. Id.
128. See id.
129. See id. Rooting the criminal adjudicatory process within a Kantian tradition
ought not imply that this process must express in all respects a Kantian conception of
justice, which in many ways is too severe for contemporary tastes. See THOMAS PANGLE,
THE ENNOBLING OF DEMOCRACY 10-11 (The Johns Hopkins University Press 1992).
130. Coercion is the central problem for Legality, as H.L.A. Hart clearly saw, which
is why his positivist theorizing strives to move beyond the Benthamite and Austinian
accounts of law. See H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 185-200 (Oxford University
Press 1961). The naked positivism of Bentham and Austin cannot account for law as
anything other than a system of coercion. Whether successful or not in dealing with the
problem of coercion, Hart's positivism highlights both our anxiety over understanding
Legality as ineluctable coercion and our passionate commitment to transcend that
understanding. See id. Coercion is the central problem for the Enlightenment, too, which
is why Legality and the Enlightenment are woven together as tightly as they are.
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culpability. 131 This instrumentalist-epistemic justification, which uses
utilitarianism to overcome the coercion problem, doesn't sit well with
our commitment to Enlightenment values. Legality that offers only
prudential reasons for compliance with law-follow the law or the state
will impose unpleasant consequences upon you-is hardly a form of
legality that harmonizes with Enlightenment notions of autonomy and
respect. 32 In fact, a state that secures compliance with law purely
through threats of sanction-indeed, a state that roots its existence
through the power to enforce law-is by definition illegitimate.133
Kantian universalism overcomes the "coercion problem" by demanding
that Legality secure compliance with law not through submission to
power, but through legitimate obligation.1 34 Legitimate obligation rests
on treating the individual as a rational agent who is entitled to have her
obedience justified through rational argument: "The requirement that the
law should address the citizen as a rational agent is ... integral to its
character as an attempt to subject human conduct to the governance of
obligation-imposing rules .... [The law's] claim on [the citizen's]
obedience must be a moral claim which is justified to her in moral
terms."
135
What counts as a moral claim and what constitutes a justification
offered "in moral terms" has long been regarded as an argument for the
common good, whatever that might be.136 It is this fact of modernist
thought that roots Legality in the concept of "community."' 37  In a
society committed to Kantian universalism, criminal adjudication strives
to justify itself by rendering criminal law as a system of obligations that
binds everyone in a community. It cannot justify itself strictly as a mere
process of filtering out the guilty from the innocent so as to promote
security. It cannot justify itself as an effective way of detecting the
dangerous. Criminal adjudication is not linked to the concept of
community because it performs a function akin to a public-health inquiry
where individuals carrying a dangerous communicable disease or virus
are identified and forcibly detained. The concept of community is
131. See generally ALEX STEIN, FOUNDATIONS OF EVIDENCE LAW (Oxford University
Press 2005).
132. See generally ROBERT PAUL WOLFF, IN DEFENSE OF ANARCHISM 3-19 (Harper &
Row 1970).
133. Id.
134. KANT, supra note 117.
135. DUFF, supra note 120, at 89.
136. See ROUSSEAU, THE SOCIAL CONTRACT (Cambridge University Press 1997);
DUFF, supra note 120, at 89-91, 148, 254-57.
137. DUFF, supra note 120, at 89 ("For the law claims authority over a whole
community, and imposes sometimes arduous obligations on its members: only by
reference to the community's common good can the law's claims be justified to all its
members."); see also id. at 254-57.
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central in criminal law because criminal adjudication must pursue more
than just a diagnostic goal of isolating the dangerous, but must also
pursue the goal of situating moral blame. Condemnation in criminal
adjudication must therefore be more than an expression of power; it must
also express the will to communicate, and to persuade offenders that they
have offended against a norm and that, as rational agents, the offenders
ought to will their own punishment.1
38
The criminal adjudicatory process, what we conventionally call
"due process," is the institutional expression of moral blaming precisely
because the community endeavors to justify a condemnation upon the
individual:
For just as the law itself must be justified to those on whom it is
binding, so too a criminal verdict must be justified to the defendant
on whom it is passed. The aim of a criminal trial is not merely to
reach an accurate judgment on the defendant's past conduct: it is to
communicate and justify that judgment-to demonstrate its justice-
to him and to others.
39
Persuasion is key here. Blaming, the prelude to condemnation, is an
invitation to argument: "[T]he proper aim of my criticism is to persuade
[the accused] to see and to accept, not my judgment, but the truth about
the moral character of his conduct; to engage with him in a search for and
an attempt to understand that truth, not simply to force my own fallible
and imperfect judgment on him.
1 40
The jury trial, in this sense, is a vitalizing expression of the
Enlightenment project because it partakes in the Habermasian ideal of
communicative action-or, to use Habermas's own locution, "universal
pragmatics" 141-in that the process of argumentation involved in such
litigation entails the requirement to "redeem" every speech-claim with
rational evidence that must, in the end, justify rational consensus of the
community and the accused. What the jury trial thus expresses are the
ambitions of a vibrant public sphere in a healthy democracy. And that
expression, in turn, suggests that every instance where societal
condemnation and punishment is re-conceptualized in an "MMDI" way
threatens to corrode the societal commitment to this sort of public sphere.
So, the criminal indictment to which Mr. Hamdi felt entitled was to
do more than hail him into court and inform him of the charges; it was to
solicit him to argue against the accusation and, most critically, promise
138. Id. at 49.
139. Id. at 115.
140. Id. at 49.
141. JURGEN HABERMAS, COMMUNICATION AND THE EVOLUTION OF SOCIETY 1-68
(Thomas McCarthy trans., Beacon Press 1979) (1976).
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him that his own government will present rational arguments to persuade
him as a rational agent that he is the offender and that his offense
justifies the ensuing punishment. 142 Mr. Hamdi wanted an indictment
rather than a governmental deeming of him as an "enemy combatant,"
because the indictment starts a process of rational argumentation that
"respects and addresses [him] as a rational and autonomous moral
agent.'
143
The moral power of Mr. Hamdi's demand rests with the fact that a
democracy transcends the "coercion problem" by transmuting coercion
into consent. We should see from all this how democracy as an ideal is
entwined with the Enlightenment project: democracy ideally expresses
that facet of the Enlightenment project which highlights autonomy and
consent as superior to external authority and coercion. What the above
discussion implies is that our criminal justice system, as an institution
within a democracy, must itself express that same facet of the
Enlightenment project. The intriguing thing here, of course, is that the
institutional ambition of the criminal justice system, it's raison d'etre,
which is the punishment of the guilty (sometimes with death), rests upon
violence and coercion. For that reason, the criminal-justice process
poses the greatest challenge of legitimacy upon our democratic culture,
as it is within that institutional sphere that coercion and violence is most
manifest.
The democratic ideal, then, is the moral basis for Hamdi's claim
that he has a right not only to be tried in a criminal court, but also a right
to be punished rather than merely locked away as an "enemy
combatant."' 144 To be punished is different than to be detained, and that
difference is juridically significant. The real power of Hamdi's claim is
not, as is often assumed, that he is entitled to the sort of due process that
characterizes criminal adjudication because we ought to be risk averse in
our diagnosis of who are dangerous terrorists and who are not. It is also
not that the obstacle course of due process better promotes accuracy. No,
the real power lies in the fact that criminal adjudication, rather than the
diagnostic inquiry into whether one is an "enemy combatant," is the only
way to legitimize the exercise of state power against a citizen. The
function of the criminal trial, on this account, is to vindicate what the
142. DUFF, supra note 120, at 116 ("A trial, like moral criticism but unlike [an inquiry
by fact finding tribunal], is a rational process of proof and argument which seeks to
persuade the person whose conduct is under scrutiny of the truth and justice of its
conclusions.").
143. Id. at 50.
144. See Herbert Morris, Persons and Punishment, 52 MONIST 475, 485 (1968) for an
extended and classic treatment of this idea of the offender asserting the right to be
punished.
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Enlightenment demands of the state: a justification for its own existence.
Modernity creates a world of perpetual justification, a world where
process must constantly express and vindicate a form of Legality that
binds the citizenry through assent and not through manipulation or force.
So, what exists behind the veil of administrative decency that
Hamdi propagates is our quandary about community, or about the depth
of our commitment "to see the wrong-doer as a fellow member of a
community from which his wrong-doing threatens to exclude him-a
community made up of a complex web of social and personal
relationships which structure our understanding of and our responses to
each other's wrong-doing."' 145 Guantanamo-style detention arises as a
reality (indeed, even as a possibility) within a society harboring a
consciousness about itself as a functioning democracy, because the war
on terror creates the specter that our communities are in peril by
irredeemably dangerous jihadists who can infiltrate undetected into them.
It is the same dynamic that characterizes the surveillance and detention
of sex offenders who have served their prison terms-remarkable
abridgement of liberties outside the criminal-justice apparatus upon those
who have already paid their societal debts because the community is
haunted by the specter of the irredeemably dangerous sexual predator.
Detention of these sorts, outside the criminal-justice apparatus,
depends upon the specter of the dangerous individual who must be
segregated and confined in a fashion reminiscent of the way the town
responded to the plague in Foucault's description of it in Discipline and
Punish.14 6 It is a form of detention that amounts to a vanquishing of the
danger. Whether the danger is of the plague, a deadly virus, the sexual
predator, or the Islamic jihadist, vanquishing the danger and the
dangerous is put in terms of survival. What Hamdi signifies, within this
perspective, is a disciplinary society where administrative processes
dedicated to some modicum of accuracy (couched as "rights") are all that
we demand, not the indulgent and lumbering communicative tribunal that
characterizes the criminal-justice process, no matter how that process
might vitalize our Kantian Enlightenment values. For what worth are
those values in the life-and-death struggle to vanquish the danger and the
dangerous?
145. DUFF, supra note 120, at 61-62.
146. FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH, supra note 2, at 198-99.
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B. The Underbelly of the Enlightenment Heritage-the Weberian
Nightmare
What has heretofore given a patina of acceptability to this modern-
day Foucauldian "political dream of the plague" is the narrative idea of a
wounded and vulnerable nation gripped in an existential crisis, seeking to
protect itself against human "missiles of destruction." The descriptive (a
threatened wounded nation) produces in this story the normative (the
adjudicative assembly line for enemy combatants). The Foucauldian
"political dream of the plague" is the Weberian nightmare.
In Dialectic of the Enlightenment, Frankfurt School theorists
Horkheimer and Adorno identify the Weberian nightmare of obsessive
instrumental rationality as the dominant cognitive orientation in Western
culture. 147 Whereas most Americans see as features of this means-ends
orientation the awesome feats of science (the amazing technological
prosthetics that drives humanity closer to becoming a God, as Freud
observed), critical theorists like Horkheimer and Adomo saw what
Weber saw 148-a cognitive orientation that feeds into and fuels our
obsessive drive to dominate and control all that surrounds us. 49 The
salient point in the Dialectic of the Enlightenment, for our purposes, is
that the instrumentalist orientation has been unleashed to devour the very
idea of the "sacred" in life. 150 September 1 th and the war on terror has
only hastened a movement along an already existing trajectory.
What we experience in our alienated, gadget-filled, but spiritually
vacant existence-what Max Weber termed our "disenchantment with
the world"' 51 -is a reflection of what Horkheimer and Adorno
diagnosed, and of how badly our capacity for reason has been corrupted
by a fetish for means-ends rationality.152 That corruption, which is on
147. See HORKHEIMER & ADORNO, supra note 117, at xi.
148. The most powerful expressions of the Weberian nightmare, in my view, are
William Faulkner's masterpiece, Absolom, Absolom!, Herman Melville's Moby Dick, and
Cormac McCarthy's Blood Meridian.
149. See HORKHEIMER & ADORNO, supra note 117, at 4. "What men want to learn
from nature is how to use it in order to wholly dominate it and other men." Id. at 85. See
also HELD, supra note 85, at 65. This is not a left-right issue, notwithstanding the
Frankfurt School's leftist orientation. New Deal liberals, in fact, are perfect exemplars of
the instrumentalist orientation, committed as they are to the idea that reason can produce
a form of social engineering that leads to greater social justice.
150. For one account of how our fidelity to science, to the point of treating it as our
new religion, has destroyed our ability to comprehend sacredness, see WENDELL BERRY,
LIFE IS A MIRACLE: AN ESSAY AGAINST MODERN SUPERSTITION (2000).
151. HELD, supra note 85, at 65; BoRRADopi, supra note 98, at 69; HORKHEIMER &
ADORNO, supra note 117, at 4-7.
152. See HORKHEIMER & ADORNO, supra note 117, at 6 ("For the Enlightenment,
whatever does not conform to the rule of computation and utility is suspect."). See
generally PANGLE, supra note 129, at 39-40 ("Rationalist society... naturally tends to
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full display in the overt means-ends reasoning of Hamdi itself, has led to
what philosopher Albert Borgmann calls a "crucial debility" in our
culture, characterized by the "expatriate quality of public life" where we
"live in self-imposed exile from communal conversation and action."
' 153
There is, then, a certain blowback effect, where a mode of thinking
that was supposed to lead to humanity's flourishing has been whipsawed
back upon us as a powerful corrupting, even imprisoning, force.
Whereas the Enlightenment, as exemplified by Rousseau, Voltaire, and
Kant, promised freedom from irrationality and darkness, it has instead
denuded the public sphere and bequeathed to us a technocratic language
that debilitates the ability to conceptualize our way out of a disastrous
course (ecologically and otherwise) on which our technocratic means-
ends orientation has put US.154
The quest for domination and control immanent within
Enlightenment's fetish for means-ends reasoning, which supposedly
promised a world of flourishing human rights (though pursued through
the blood of ancient cultures, such as the native peoples in the Americas),
drained modernity of the very vitality that modernist thinkers insisted
stress material welfare, while ignoring the spirit or soul," leading to a "spiritual
barrenness"); RICHARD J. BERNSTEIN, BEYOND OBJECTIVISM AND RELATIVISM: SCIENCE,
HERMENEUTICS, AND PRAXIS 189 (1985).
153. ALBERT BORGMANN, TECHNOLOGY AND CHARACTER OF CONTEMPORARY LIFE 3
(1984). The expatriation of public life is, of course, not a product of 9/11; it is a feature
of modem-day American life that evolved from the way life was lived in the nineteenth
century in this young nation:
In the nineteenth century... the organic interchange of the public and the
private came under stress and was finally destroyed. Destruction came in the
guise of ostentation. This was the time when department stores, libraries, and
opera houses were erected as magnificent settings in which the public could
gather and enjoy itself. But the people who filled these spaces had become
silent, passive, and distracted. No longer actors and connoisseurs of public
spectacles, they had begun to turn into recipients and consumers of
commodities, produced for them by experts.
Id. at 41.
154. See HORKHEIMER & ADORNO, supra note 117, at xi ("[Ilnstead of entering into a
truly human condition, [mankind] is sinking into a new kind of barbarism."). Wendell
Berry encapsulates this idea:
The problem.., is that we are using the wrong language. The language we use
to speak of the world and its creatures, including ourselves, has gained a certain
analytical power (along with a lot of expertish pomp) but has lost much of its
power to designate what is being analyzed or to convey any respect or care or
affection or devotion toward it. As a result we have a lot of genuinely
concerned people calling upon us to "save" a world which their language
simultaneously reduces to an assemblage of perfectly featureless and dispirited
"ecosystems," "organisms," "environments," "mechanisms," and the like. It is
impossible to prefigure the salvation of the world in the same language by
which the world has been dismembered and defaced.
BERRY, supra note 150, at 8.
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was distinctive about Enlightenment society. 155 It has instead taken us to
the brink of annihilation in a world where the disparities of wealth are
grossly appalling and human behavior slides so easily into barbarism and
violence, usually in the service of preserving or further deepening those
disparities. Whereas the Enlightenment broke the bondage of atrophied
tradition, it has wrought a world where little is sacred, and what little
remains is rapidly dwindling, where "what holds us all together is a cold
and impersonal design."'1 56  We slaughtered cultures within our own
country-Native American cultures that we still do not fully appreciate
and comprehend-with the quintessential Enlightenment slogan,
Manifest Destiny, only to bring about an ennui and despair that produces
a nostalgic yearning for the sacred upon which those slaughtered cultures
built their now-defunct way of life.
C. Habermas and the Public Sphere
The classic Frankfurt School diagnosis of American culture is grim
and pessimistic. Jurgen Habermas rebels against the pessimism that
pervades Dialectic of the Enlightenment, but he does not repudiate the
essential diagnosis found there, though he surely seeks to deepen it with
what he regards as a more nuanced investigation into the true roots of
Enlightenment rationality. 157  For our purposes, to this observation of
humanity's destructive fetish with means-ends rationality, we may add
Habermas's emphasis on the public sphere as an optimistic source of
rationality. 158 In the idealized vision that Habermas presents, the public
sphere consists of voluntary associations dedicated to promoting
unconstrained rational interchange among free and equal participants of
good will. 159 It is in the public sphere, if truly healthy (free from the
155. BORRADORI, supra note 98, at 69.
156. BORGMANN, supra note 153, at 3; see also HORKHEIMER & ADORNO, supra note
117, at 3.
157. See JURGEN HABERMAS, STRUCTURAL TRANSFORMATION OF THE PUBLIC SPHERE:
AN INVESTIGATION OF A CATEGORY OF BOURGEOIS SOCIETY (1962) [hereinafter
HABERMAS, STRUCTURAL TRANSFORMATION]. Habermas's intervention into the discourse
of 9/11 is most interesting because his view of the Enlightement as an unfinished project
competes directly with the view, expressed by the intellectual foundation of the Jihadists
we regard as our current enemy, that the "Islamic project ha[s] been left incomplete."
BORRADORI, supra note 98, at 69. See generally lAIN BOAL, T.J. CLARK, JOSEPH
MATTHEWS, & MICHAEL WATTS, AFFLICTED POWERS: CAPITAL AND SPECTACLE IN A NEW
AGE OF WAR (2006).
158. See Jurgen Habermas, Further Reflections on the Public Sphere, in HABERMAS
AND THE PUBLIC SPHERE 441 (Craig Calhoun ed., 1992) [hereinafter Habermas, Further
Reflections]; see also BORRADORI, supra note 98, at 13, 57-63; see generally HABERMAS,
STRUCTURAL TRANSFORMATION, supra note 157; THE CAMBRIDGE COMPANION TO
HABERMAS (Stephen K. White ed., 1995).
159. See sources cited supra note 158.
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distortions of domination), that the common good can be gleaned. 160 It is
in the public sphere that government overreaching can be checked and
averted. 16 1 On this view, world public opinion, cultivated within vibrant
public spheres that somehow escape the distortions of governmental and
corporate propaganda, may function, in this post-Cold War era that has
bled into the Age of Terror, as the only potential countervailing force to
the dominant super-power, the United States.
What a vibrant public sphere provides are tools to resist naturalistic
illusions undergirding social institutions and practices that preserve and
promote spheres of inequality and regimes of domination, but that seem
to be socially necessary. The idea here is well-rehearsed in the literature
of critical theory: that which is socially constructed is made to appear
fixed and natural; that which serves narrow interests of power and
privilege is made to appear to serve everyone. 162 A culture beholden to
means-ends thinking is a culture that has lost its capacity for critical
theorizing, and such a culture is, as a result, at the mercy of its illusions.
A vibrant public sphere that successfully exposes illusions, which
conceal unhealthy conditions for society, is crucial to social change, for
the exposing of such illusions is exactly what loosens the screws that
keep unworthy social institutions intact. 163 A vibrant public sphere is the
environment for rendering institutions malleable and open to change,
which is why thinkers from Kant to Habermas regard "the public sphere
as the definitive institution of democracy."'' 64 The big problem, however,
is that the "public sphere" in consumerist societies such as ours may
itself have evolved into an illusion, propping up the justificatory myth
that the Sovereign's activity is in check and in harmony with the consent
of the governed. 165 Consider the implications if we find, as an empirical
matter, that the public sphere is beholden to the powerful and privileged
but still retains the image of functioning largely in its idealized way.
That false consciousness, to use a very unfashionable phrase, creates
manifold opportunities for a bloated sovereignty-indeed, perhaps one
like we are witnessing today-and a bloated sovereignty coexists nicely
with a consumerist mentality that cannot seem to imagine any alternative
to the present, other than a future that consists only of the present just
with more snazzy gadgets.
160. See id.; see also Jurgen Habermas, What is Universal Pragmatics?, in
COMMUNICATION AND THE EVOLUTION OF SOCIETY 1-68 (Thomas McCarthy ed., 1979).
161. Habermas, Further Reflections, supra note 158, at 446.
162. See generally HELD, supra note 85.
163. See generally ROBERTO UNGER, DEMOCRACY REALIZED: THE PROGRESSIVE
ALTERNATIVE (Verso 1998).
164. BORRADORI, supra note 98, at 57.
165. See generally BOAL, ET. AL., supra note 157, at 34 ("[T]he dispersal and vacuity
of the public sphere.., is necessary to the maintenance of 'consumer society.').
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Evidence abounds that this false consciousness pervades America
today, with disastrous consequences. Vital issues of war and peace (let
alone important issues revolving around health care, education, and
economic well-being) are presented in stage-managed fashion, with vast
sums of money spent on manipulating over-worked, anxiety-riddled
consumerists who cling to an anachronistic, jingoistic, pre-Cold War
understanding of what this nation stands for in the world. Voting is no
longer the culminating act that follows a period of reflection and probing
dialogue and debate, but rather voting is a reaction to "campaigns,"
operations not unlike military campaigns and Madison Avenue
advertising campaigns, where the human commodity on display (the
"candidate") has been selected largely through big-money donors and
inside-power politics. 1
66
If the hollowed-out nature of democracy captures something real in
our culture, then is it really surprising that the great institutional
embodiment of democracy and the most vitalizing expression of the
Enlightenment, the right to trial by jury, has been under siege? 167 And if
166. See HARDT & NEGRI, supra note 50, at 231 ("The end of the cold war was
supposed to be the ultimate victory of democracy, but today the concept and practices of
democracy are everywhere in crisis."). The discussion in the text is not to be taken to
imply a lost golden age. Far from it, American democracy, from the Fifties on, "was an
institutionalized conflict between elites for political power, rather than any system of
actual popular participation in the classical sense." PURCELL, supra note 8, at 259. In
American-style democracy, "[1]arge-scale nonparticipation and apathy was socially
beneficial, since it helped preserve democratic stability .. " Id. Philosopher Albert
Borgmann is particularly astute in showing that democracy has been hollowed out in
American culture:
The nation's mood is sullen. Although such sullenness is to be found in most
advanced technological countries, it here takes on a peculiarly American
visage. It displays various qualities and manifestations.... [This sullenness
presents itself as an] inability to respond [to national problems,] as a sort of
paralyzed irresponsibility.... This indolence appears not only in the
irresponsible decisions of consumers and politicians but most fatally perhaps in
the indifference of voters.
BORGMANN, supra note 153, at 7.
167. On the surface it seems that the democracy-promoting function of the jury trial
had reached its efflorescence in the so-called Apprendi revolution. See Apprendi v. New
Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000). But it is now clear that Justice Scalia's homage to the jury
trial as a vitalizing expression of our democracy rests upon social conditions that are
hardly congenial to the flourishing of the jury trial as a key ingredient in our detention
practices. What this reflects is the broader point that ideas often reach their apex when
the conditions producing them are already disappearing. See TERRY EAGLETON, AFTER
THEORY 29 (2003). At the same time, the more firmly we root ourselves in a
bureaucratic way of living, with ultimate priority given to instrumental reasoning, the
more powerful is a practice like the jury trial, and the more deeply it holds sway in our
imagination and our consciousness. Scalia's homage to the jury trial as a "circuit
breaker" in our democracy can profitably be understood in this light. Our fidelity to the
trial by jury, even when inconvenient, stands as a critique of, and warning against, our
cultural obsession with instrumentalist modes of thought. Indeed, the more insistent we
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we abide the erosion of it, if we find that trial by jury cannot purchase its
way into our culture because it cannot satisfy our quest for means-ends
efficiency and because we have lost our vocabulary for non-
instrumentalist justificatory ways of thinking and being, then what
democratic institutions are next?
V. Hamdi Within Habermas's Social Ontology
The West confronts other cultures, which owe their character to the
imprint of one of the great world religions, only through the
provocative and trivializing aura of a banal materialistic culture.
Jurgen Habermas
168
Habermas's social ontology illuminates what is at stake in our war-
on-terror jurisprudence, exemplified by cases like Hamdi. Habermas's
theory of communicative action entails a society with two basic spheres,
which he calls the "lifeworld" and "system" spheres.' 69 The lifeworld
sphere-a construct Habermas acquired from Edmund Husserl, 7° which
roughly correlates with, but broadens, the concept of the public sphere-
consists of those domains in life that we experience with our family and
friends, our cultural life, our political life outside of organized politics
(especially party politics), and our voluntary associations.17' The mass
media, when performing independently of government and corporate
interests, is part of the lifeworld sphere. Communication, participatory
dialogue, and persuasion through reasoned discourse, as opposed to
coercion, is the idealized medium of the lifeworld sphere. 172 Consensus
is the animating feature of the lifeworld sphere, which promotes human
bonding, community integration, and value-sharing. 173  The
communicative action of the lifeworld sphere thus correlates with the
"answerability" thesis discussed above, the non-instrumentalist
understanding of the criminal trial as a process of rational persuasion,
where even the accused, as a Kantian rational agent, is obliged to consent
to her own punishment. It is that idealized integration of the accused
with the judgment of the community that gives the criminal adjudicatory
are in adhering to it, especially in circumstances where "necessity" gives the practice a
frame of extravagance, the more searing is its value as a critique of means-ends thinking.
168. JURGEN HABERMAS, THE DIVIDED WEST 12 (2006).
169. BORRADORI, supra note 98, at 65.
170. EDMUND HUSSERL, THE CRISIS OF THE EUROPEAN SCIENCES AND
TRANSCENDENTAL PHENOMENOLOGY: AN INTRODUCTION TO PHENOMENOLOGICAL
PHILOSOPHY (David Carr trans., 1970).
171. BORRADORI, supra note 98, at 65.
172. Id.
173. Id. at 65-66.
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process its preeminent moral standing in our Enlightenment culture-
preeminent precisely because that idealized integration is most difficult
in matters of crime and punishment.
So, as I have presented it here, the criminal adjudicatory process, in
its idealized form, with trial by jury as the centerpiece to the paradigm of
how the Sovereign justifies and legitimates the detention of the
dangerous, both exemplifies and nourishes the lifeworld sphere. Each
time a jury deliberates fairly and reaches an honest verdict, it presents
itself as a beacon of the lifeworld sphere, where rational persuasion
among free and equal persons is the bedrock value. Each fair and honest
verdict nourishes the lifeworld sphere by strengthening our commitment
to this mode of communicating with each other, even with those who
have breached social norms in the most horrific ways. The more awful
the crime, the more powerful is the fair and honest verdict in nourishing
the lifeworld sphere. This idea perhaps explains, in part, why a criminal
trial is usually more healing and more strengthening of a community, and
hence more desirable, than a resolution through an administrative fact-
finding tribunal. The power of a fair and robust criminal process to heal
and strengthen a community is emblematic of the larger point being
suggested here, that instrumental rationality cannot bind a people
together, but instead, when it predominates and seeps too deep into the
culture, it ruptures what binds individuals, and leads to a passive
consumerist individuality that characterizes modem American life.
Those who are familiar with the doctrinal struggles that take place
within criminal procedure will understand that the criminal adjudicatory
process is constantly being tugged out of the lifeworld sphere (where
rights are understood as trumps) and shoved into the system sphere
(where the barometer of fairness is accurate outcomes and where "rights"
must purchase their way into existence by promoting reliable
outcomes). 174 The system sphere is much more recognizable because of
how our capitalist economy developed and because of the particular way
in which we have cultivated our Enlightenment heritage. The system
sphere is characterized by communicative action motivated and
prompted by instrumental reasoning; means-ends discourse is the
language of the system world. 175 The system sphere is the world of
174. For a good illustration of two competing visions of "rights" within constitutional
criminal procedure, see, Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). In Strickland,
Justice O'Connor's majority opinion treats the right to counsel as tied to the accuracy of
the outcome of the trial. Justice Marshall's dissent understands the "right" to counsel to
be in the nature of a societal promise, thus leading him to conclude that deficient
performance by defense counsel constitutes a Sixth Amendment violation regardless of
the impact on the outcome.
175. BORRADORI, supra note 98, at 66-67.
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governmentality and bureaucracy, where more rigid role-playing
dominates how people interact. This is a sphere where language and
meaning are instrumental in nature and where people are regarded as
atomistic, self-interested, and consumeristic. 176 The medium through
which the system sphere operates in the United States is money and
power. The more complex the society, and the more administrative and
bureaucratic, the more important is the role of the system sphere in
maintaining social cohesion. 1
77
If that is true, then the Court's decision in Hamdi, as a cultural
document rather than just a narrow jurisprudential one, ought to warn us
about an important danger we face in our culture as we proceed further
along towards the darkness that is the so-called war on terror. Kant
identified two forms of rationality that roughly correlate with
Habermas's lifeworld and system spheres: instrumental rationality
situates the reasoning agent in a particular role with a predetermined end;
universal reason (what we typically regard as Kantian rationality) frees
the reasoning agent to use reason as an end in itself, which is the sort of
reasoning process that undergirds the lifeworld sphere and the jury
trial. 178 In After the Gold Rush, Part I, I endeavor to show that the
Hamdi Court takes on a role within the so-called war on terror-a role
that seems so utterly natural, given our pax Americana consciousness,
that it is virtually unnoticeable-that conceals how that so-called war
exists to hasten the development of Guantanamo-style detention. 179 The
suggestion here is that this role with a predetermined end (winning the
"war on terror," with no articulation of what "winning" means) propels
the Court to use instrumental rationality to undercut the vitalizing
expression of Kantian rationality. In this sense, Hamdi illuminates how
deeply indeed we are at war with ourselves.
The implications are far-reaching. The more reductionist our
language and the more reductionist our mode of adjudication, governed
by instrumental reasoning alone, then the more mechanistic we become,
not only in the legal "system" we use, but in the "system" sphere we
inhabit, and thus in the consciousness we ultimately formulate. It is a
consciousness in which "whatever does not conform to the rule of
computation and utility is suspect.''8°  The more mechanistic the
176. Id.
177. We might understand jurists like O'Connor to be largely wedded to the system
sphere, with her fetish for outcome-determinative interpretations of constitutional rights.
We might understand the United States Sentencing Guidelines and the pre-Apprendi
jurisprudence to partake in the system sphere, too.
178. See Michel Foucault, What is Enlightenment, FOUCAULT, ETHICS, supra note 1,
at 307; see also HORKHEIMER & ADORNO, supra note 117, at 83-84.
179. Williams, supra note 6, at 377, et. seq.
180. HORKHEIMER & ADORNO, supra note 117, at 6.
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consciousness, the more total is the power of the Sovereign, with the
endgame being one that the world has already experienced, a system-
sphere Nazi regime that embraced "the same kind of mechanistic
thinking that, in an outwardly very different form, contributed to what
most people would consider the glories of modern science."1 81 And lest
we comfort ourselves with the view that the Holocaust is sui generis, an
aberration in a Western culture imbued with an Enlightenment heritage
that assures our essential goodness, we would do well to consider the
Scottish poet Edwin Muir's observation:
Think of all the native tribes and peoples, all the simple indigenous
forms of life which Britain trampled upon, corrupted, destroyed...
in the name of commercial progress. All these things, once valuable,
once human, are now dead and rotten. The nineteenth century
thought that machinery was a moral force and would make men
better. How could the steam-engine make men better? Hitler
marching into Prague is connected with all this. If I look back over
the last hundred years it seems to me that we have lost more than we
have gained, that what we have lost was valuable, and that what we
have gained is trifling, for what we have lost was old and what we
have gained is merely new.
182
The true spirit of trial by jury is the resistance against a mechanistic
modality where means-ends consciousness is preeminent and where
violence to accomplish control and domination, sweetened with nice-
sounding words (freedom, democracy) that have devolved into mere
gestures, is too easily unleashed. The tension in criminal adjudication
between this resistance and the attractions of instrumental rationality is
no intrinsic feature of 9/11, for that tension permeates, if not defines, the
entire enterprise of criminal procedure.
1 83
181. ERWIN CHARGAFF, HERACLITEAN FIRE: SKETCHES FROM A LIFE BEFORE NATURE
4-5 (1978). See Jordan J. Paust, Executive Plans and Authorizations to Violate
International Law Concerning Treatment and Interrogation of Detainees, 43 COLUM. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 811 (2005) ("Not since the Nazi era have so many lawyers been so
clearly involved in international crimes concerning the treatment and interrogation of
persons detained during war.").
182. EDwtN MUIR, THE STORY AND THE FABLE 257 (1987).
183. Indeed, we may go further still, as the philosopher Judith Butler does when she
knits together the growth of sovereignty and the expansion of governmentality:
[P]rocedures of governmentality, which are irreducible to law, are invoked to
extend and fortify forms of sovereignty that are equally irreducible to law....
The suspension of the rule of law allows for the convergence of
govemmentality and sovereignty.... Law itself is either suspended, or
regarded as an instrument that the state may use in the service of constraining
and monitoring a given population; the state is not subject to the rule of law,
but law can be suspended or deployed tactically and partially to suit the
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The more crucial the role of the system sphere in maintaining social
cohesion, the more penetrating is that sphere's influence on human
consciousness. The system sphere operates on and produces a
consciousness beholden to means-ends thinking. This consciousness is
peculiarly well-suited to a consumer culture where people are passive
and manipulable by corporate and governmental interests. One might, in
a very loose sense, correlate the duality of the lifeworld sphere and the
system sphere with Jean-Paul Sartre's distinction between pour-soi
(being-for-itself) and en-soi (being-in-itself)-roughly, human existence
versus the existence of things. 184  The lifeworld sphere promotes a
person's embrace of his pour-soi character of his existence, his capacity
for action, decision, and heightened consciousness. The system sphere
tugs in the other direction, towards an en-soi consciousness, which is
passive and more thing-like185 -a consciousness marred by a repression
that leads to self-destruction and aggression.
186
The system-sphere consciousness loses the ability to appreciate the
sacred in life, the non-instrumental ways of being, producing what
Arthur Koestler characterized as a "civilization in a cul de sac," an
"everybody-for-himself civilization,"' 87 with masses who distract
themselves with television and dim-witted movies, who understand and
respond to the world amoeba-like as a source of pain and pleasure, and
who cast about for cheap self-help recipes as a salve for a desiccated
spiritual ennui. Role-players through and through, persons within an all-
requirements of a state that seeks more and more to allocate sovereign power to
its executive and administrative powers.
BUTLER, supra note 38, at 55 (emphasis added).
184. See JEAN-PAUL SARTRE, BEING AND NOTHINGNESS 119-58 (Hazel E. Barnes
trans., 1992) (1943).
185. Cf FRANCIS FUKUYAMA, OUR POSTHUMAN FUTURE: CONSEQUENCES OF THE
BIOTECHNOLOGY REVOLUTION (2002) (suggesting the logical endpoint of technological
advances is the rendering of human beings into devices).
186. The contrast between the lifeworld sphere and the system sphere is reminiscent
of Herbert Marcuse's treatment of aggression in human behavior. Marcuse formulated
the problem of aggression in terms of a psychological and historical struggle between the
forces of life and death. The only way to avert the destruction of humankind, by way of
this aggression, Marcuse argued, is to restructure society in a way that permits the
accumulation and release of erotic energy. This diagnosis and prescription had an anti-
capitalist component to it, as Marcuse believed that capitalism tended to localize
eroticism in the genitals, thereby transforming the rest of the body into an instrument of
labor. See HERBERT MARCUSE, EROS AND CIVILIZATION (Beacon 1956). Presumably, an
expanded, more vibrant lifeworld sphere would promote a form of sexual liberation that
Marcuse might have approved of.
187. MORRIS BERMAN, DARK AGES AMERICA: THE FINAL PHASE OF EMPIRE 77 (2006);
see generally PANGLE, supra note 129, at 80. For one of the original, and still most
powerful, warnings of this trajectory in Western culture, see FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE, THUS
SPAKE ZARATHUSTRA, Prologue, sec. 5, in THE PORTABLE NIETZSCHE 128 (Walter
Kaufmann trans., 1972).
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encompassing system sphere lose the ability to choose their own ends.
That particular ability, the ability to express oneself authentically through
the choosing of ones own ends in life, is the most redeeming feature of a
healthy lifeworld sphere. Thus, it is here where the entwining
relationship of the lifeworld and system spheres becomes crucial in
critical theory. Habermas speaks of the system sphere as a product of the
lifeworld, for the latter is the locus of energy and meaning-making in a
society-things that the "system" needs to function. 188 But the "system"
sphere, that domain of instrumental reasoning where the impulse to
control and dominate always percolates, has a greediness that is hard to
contain. It can only be contained within a society that takes seriously the
nurturing and empowerment of the lifeworld. Like the struggle between
Eros and Thanatos, the struggle between the lifeworld and the system
spheres always contains the threat that the latter will override-
"colonialize," to use Habermas's locution' 89 -the former.
Many observers of American culture have warned against this
colonization, which continues largely unabated. 190 The mass media,
properly in the domain of the lifeworld sphere, has been thoroughly
hijacked by corporate power; education no longer serves a democratic
culture where critical thinking is the pedagogical aim, but instead aims to
produce the human wrenches and pliers, the spare parts, or the disposable
accoutrements, of an economic machinery that serves narrower and
narrower interests. Students entering college today are said to resort
more often to cheating than previous generations,1 9 which is hardly
surprising when the prevailing attitude among parents and students alike
is focused on getting the credentials so as not to be on the outside
looking in (a quintessential system-sphere consciousness), when almost
188. JURGEN HABERMAS, THE THEORY OF COMMUNICATIVE ACTION 393-96 (1985).
189. Habermas, Further Reflections, supra note 158, at 446.
190. See, e.g., EAGLETON, supra note 167, at 123 ("Modem capitalist societies are so
preoccupied with thinking in terms of means and ends.., that their moral thinking
becomes infected by this model as well."); BENJAMIN BARBER, JIHAD VS. MCWORLD 156
(1996) ("When the ethos of Disney becomes synonymous with the ethics of liberty and
when consumers come to be seen as identical with citizens, genuine democratization is
derailed."). The system sphere's colonization of the lifeworld sphere is often expressed
in terms of the degrading and shriveling of the "public" space in American society,
turning our nation into what Michael Sandel calls a "procedural republic." See MICHAEL
SANDEL, DEMOCRACY'S DISCONTENT: AMERICA IN SEARCH OF A PUBLIC PHILOSOPHY 81
(1998); see generally WILL HUTTON, THE WORLD WE'RE IN 80 (2003); BORGMANN, SUpra
note 153.
191. For discussions of student cheating see Sharon Cromwell, What Can We Do To
Curb Student Cheating, EDUCATION WORLD, 2006, available at
http://www.educationworld.com/a_admin/admin/admin375.shtml; Kate Zemike, With
Student Cheating on the Rise, More Colleges Are Turning to Honor Codes, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 2, 2002, available at http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res =
9B03E1DA163EF931A35752C1A9649C8B63.
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every student shares the same major-upward mobility. More and more
decisions that are vital to our health and well-being are delegated to
experts who fill slots within vast bureaucratic apparatuses. More and
more of life is removed from democratic control-a symptom of the
shrinkage of the lifeworld sphere brought on by the colonization of the
system sphere. What we experience, as a culture, is greater and greater
anomie and alienation, erosion of social bonds, passivity, drug and
alcohol abuse, and violence. The triumph of the system sphere and the
withering of the lifeworld sphere manifests itself in the cozy bomb-
shelter consciousness, where we had once accepted as rational the
construction of livable bomb shelters as a suitable response to the specter
of nuclear annihilation because we abandoned the capacity to critique the
irrationality of the Cold War system that produced the threat in the first
place. 192
The democratic project within our Enlightenment heritage insists
upon a civic maturation where "the people" have the capacity and the
willingness to use their own reasoning powers to govern themselves, as
opposed to delegate governance to elites, charismatic charlatans, and so-
called experts, all of whom ultimately serve narrower and narrower
interests of privilege.193  It is hard to defend the view that American
society has moved steadily in the direction of this civic maturation. We
seem to be moving away from it, with a populace deeply manipulated by
a "public relations industry, whose objective is to engineer consent
among consumers of mass culture."'
' 94
192. Max Weber used another image which also captures the triumph of the system
sphere, the image of an "iron cage, a prison of efficient bureaucratic blindness created by
the indiscriminate growth of utilitarian and instrumental rationality." BORRADORI, supra
note 98, at 71.
193. Immanuel Kant, An Answer to the Question: "What is Enlightenment?" in
KANT'S POLITICAL WRITINGS 54 (Hans Reiss ed., H.B. Nisbet trans., 1970).
194. BORRADORI, supra note 98, at 57; see BERMAN, supra note 187; BARBER, supra
note 188, at 163 ("Freely made choices are subject to marketing, merchandizing,
advertising, and packaging influences, all of which.., are intended to shape, modify,
divert, and even compel choices in the direction of what producers need to sell rather than
of what consumers need to buy."). See generally, HORKHEIMER & ADORNO, supra note
117, at 120 et. seq. One legal scholar, in discussing how it is that we have come to accept
as worthy of consideration the lawful torturing of other human beings, rightly emphasizes
the degraded democratic culture we have created without the prompting of Al Quaeda or
any other Jihadist committed to do us harm:
The electronic information and entertainment culture strengthens the mistaken
responses to reality that justifying torture requires. With physical social world
experiences being replaced by digitalized, isolated, smell-free, two-dimensional
images over which Americans have instant and complete (remote) control, how
can this not encourage feelings of complete control over reality? With TV and
radio stations and web sites flooding Americans with data, information,
opinions and political spin, how can this not encourage feelings of complete
knowledge about reality? With endless cultural images of the good guys
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So here is the grim message that is intricated in the Hamdi narrative.
At the very moment when it was most propitious to fortify a non-
instrumentalist foundation for our commitment to trial by jury (and the
other procedural rights that are associated with our criminal justice
process) the Court does the precise opposite. 195  It uses means-ends
thinking to place a veil of administrative decency over what most now
recognize to be a heinous practice in Guantanamo Bay. It endorses a
style of thinking and a form of consciousness that is itself a key source of
the problem we now find ourselves facing. If it is true, as Habermas
presents it, that Islamic fundamentalism, and the terrorism associated
with it, operates in a medium of violence arising from a "communicative
pathology"--a "spiral of violence" rooted in a "spiral of distorted
communication that leads through the spiral of uncontrolled reciprocal
mistrust" 19 6-then our juridical response to it, culminating in opinions
like Hamdi, replicates that "breakdown of communication" by bracketing
the most crucial institutional embodiment of our commitment to rational
and publicly transparent communication within our Enlightenment
culture-the jury trial-and thereby sapping it of that significance.
1 97
This reinforcing "communicative pathology" in this so-called Age of
Terror presents the most pressing challenge to our crippled democracy.
The challenge of a healthy democracy is overcoming the very real
danger that the form of consciousness that the system sphere operates on
overcoming bad guys simply because they are tough enough to do it, how can
this not encourage individualism and determinism among us? Once we believe
we know everything we need to know, and that our willingness to defeat evil is
synonymous with our willingness to use violence, and we do not pause to
ponder if we might be wrong, or if we might be ineffectual, or if we might not
understand, the we are ready to torture. At that point, it's a mere syllogism to
safety.
Michael Hatfield, Fear, Legal Indeterminacy, and the American Lawyering Culture, 10
LEWIS & CLARK L. REv. 511, 526-27 (2006). See generally BOAL, ET. AL., supra note
157, at 21 ("The modem state... has come to need weak citizenship."). Cf SIGMUND
FREUD, GROUP PSYCHOLOGY AND THE ANALYSIS OF THE EGO (1922) (noting throughout
the willingness of individuals to yield unquestioningly to powerful external agencies).
195. I say "propitious" because our nemesis in this so-called war on terror implacably
opposes our modernist culture. See BORRADORI, supra note 98, at 14 ("The explicit
ideology of the terrorists who attacked the Twin Towers and the Pentagon on 9/11 is a
rejection of the kind of modernity and secularization that in the philosophical tradition is
associated with the concept of Enlightenment."); BARBER, supra note 190, at 22-23
("America can spread a pop cultural civilization of movies, music, software, fast food,
and information technology across the world until the world is reborn as McWorld, but it
cannot control the blowback that is Jihad .. "); id. at 62 ("[Islamic terrorism is the]
product of toxic ideologies and religious fanaticism" and "historical circumstances ... to
which, given its extraordinary military, economic, and cultural power, the United States
has to some degree contributed-whether inadvertently or through explicit imperialist
ambition or, most probably, some confusing combination of both.").
196. A Dialogue with Jurgen Habermas, in BORRADORI, supra note 98, at 35.
197. BORRADORI, supra note 98, at 19, 35.
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and produces-what I'll abbreviate as the consumer-consciousness, for
that captures the passivity and manipulability of the system-sphere
person-squeezes out the participatory-dialogue consciousness that is
most congenial to the lifeworld sphere.198 Philosopher Albert Borgmann
nicely captures the idea here, describing how the Enlightenment project
seemingly placed the individual at the center of its ontology, but
somewhere along the way led to the individual becoming "little more
than an accomplice to a gigantic and systematic enterprise that, though
resting on the consent of most people, was given a shape and momentum
of its own."1 99  The very power of the Enlightenment to produce
magnificent technological prosthetics that "subdued and tamed reality"
has reduced the individual self to the status of ignoble "consumer.'
200
The "consumer" is but an appendage to the system sphere, a mockery of
the ennobled, high-functioning individuals who must populate the
lifeworld sphere.
The state is too beholden to moneyed interest, or to corporate
power, to ally itself with promoting the lifeworld.2° 1 So government is
not the solution to our cultural ills, but rather is one source of the
problem, as it will do nothing to avert the relentless, inexorable
expansion of markets and administration. The so-called war on terror,
which in my view can be traced to that expansion, has only fueled the
state's alliance with a system-sphere mentality. This may partly explain
why "[s]ome say that ours is a world in which real democracy has
become impossible, perhaps even unthinkable. 2 °2 In Habermas's social
ontology, Hamdi falls smack in the middle of the system sphere. Yaser
Hamdi struggled unsuccessfully to remain in the lifeworld sphere against
the state's quest to extend the system sphere, a quest to intensify the
exertion of sovereign power through executive and administrative
203powers. However, the Court cannot reconcile the Sovereign's desire
to erect a simplistic, life-falsifying ontology that includes enemy
combatants within a so-called war on terror with the juridical demand for
due process merely by constructing a legal regime from certain
198. For a classic text on the role of consciousness and social change, see CHARLES
REICH, THE GREENING OF AMERICA (1970).
199. BORGMANN, supra note 153, at 79.
200. Id. at 79-80. See BORRADORI, supra note 98, at 57 ("mass consumption and its
ideology, [and] consumerism.., silences rational-critical consensus .... ").
201. See BORRADORI, supra note 98, at 58 ("Maneuvered by multinational
corporations and the unbridled free market, mass culture... imposes its own rules of
democratic participation: namely, utilitarian rules serving private interests rather than
universal rules serving the public interest.").
202. HARDT &NEGRI, supra note 50, at 18.
203. BUTLER, supra note 38, at 56.
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conceptual remnants picked out of Mathews v. Eldridge.20 4  The fact
remains that Hamdi endorses and exemplifies the deployment of law to
pursue a system-sphere logic-a means-ends rationality-of detecting
and detaining bare-life beings who are deemed "dangerous." The Court
repudiates trial by jury, which can only be justified ultimately through a
lifeworld logic, at the very moment our commitment to it is most acutely
tested. While civil libertarians applauded the Court's refusal to issue the
blank check to the Executive, too many have ignored the sinister
displacement of the most important expression of what is sacred in our
Enlightenment heritage with a mode of reasoning that expresses that
heritage's threatening dark side.205
We falsify the real force of that displacement by marginalizing it to
the realm of some state of exception, as opposed to seeing it as a
fortification of a certain global ambition on the part of the United States
that continues to be unexamined within the juridical realm, despite the
fact that what is supposedly sacred in that realm-an entire framework of
rights that serve as genuine limits to governmental power-is precisely
what must be protected by our courts.20 6 It is indeed odd to affirm our
commitment to the rule of law through the construction of a legal regime,
at the hands of all three branches-which is the basis for some scholarly
applause for Hamdi-that is itself prompted by a desire to jettison the
very legal regime that is supposed to reflect our commitment to the rule
of law. This is law as a shell game.2 °7
One would think that the rule of law contains some limit to the
Sovereign's ability to further confine the domain of a particular legal
204. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976). Mathews v. Eldridge exemplifies a
balancing methodology in constitutional analysis where the government's interests are
assessed against an individual's liberty interests. See generally Owen Fiss, The War
against Terror and the Rule of Law, 26 OXFORD J. OF LEGAL STUDIES 235, 244-45 (2006)
(criticizing use of Mathews v. Eldridge in enemy-combatant-detention context); Jerry L.
Mashaw, The Supreme Court's Due Process Calculus for Administrative Adjudication in
Mathews v. Eldridge: Three Factors in Search of a Theory of Value, 44 U. CHI. L. REv.
28 (1976) (noting dilution of due process requirements in holding).
205. Owen Fiss gestures at this critique in his criticism of O'Connor's reasoning. See
Fiss, supra note 204, at 244. He argues that O'Connor's "error was to ignore the
distinction between two types of liberties-those that are guaranteed by the Constitution
itself... and those liberties that people enjoy in society, but which are not
constitutionally protected .. " Id.
206. It has almost become commonplace to recognize that our courts are anemic in
restraining the Executive in this climate of terrorist anxiety, notwithstanding high profile
Supreme Court decisions like Rasul, Hamdi, and Hamdan. This is largely because torture
and extraordinary rendition, and the policies that sanction those practices, evade judicial
review and oversight. See SCHWARZ, supra note 10, at 88, 99.
207. For another account of this shell-game feature of law, within the context of our
so-called war on terror, see BUTLER, supra note 38, at 55-56. See UGO MATTEI AND
LAURA NADER, PLUNDER: WHEN THE RULE OF LAW IS ILLEGAL 4 (2008) (describing rule-
of-law rhetoric as "a cover, a camouflage, or as propaganda"). See generally id. at 10-34.
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regime, like the criminal justice system, and erect another. One would
think that, before punting the issue of what is sacred within a
constitutional democracy to the democratic branches of government-
Issacharoff and Pildes's "process approach" 208-the Court would note
how far we have moved away from the political environment that the
Founders knew, gripped now by partisan politics where political party
affiliation is "a much more important variable in predicting the behavior
of members of Congress vis-A-vis the President than the fact that these
members work in the legislative branch., 20 9  Gripped, indeed, by
something far more frightening and ominous:
Our Congress has been hijacked by corporate America and its
enforcer, the imperial military machine.... We have allowed our
institutions to be taken over in the name of a globalized American
empire that is totally alien in concept to anything our founders had in
mind. I suspect it is far too late in the day for us to restore the
republic that we lost a half-century ago.210
One would think that, as part of our self-identity as a nation, our
highest Court would confront the most elemental question: by what
framework of legality may the Sovereign decide that a United States
citizen (or anyone, for that matter) is unworthy of the sort of
communicative enterprise that our Enlightenment heritage rightly regards
to be the sine qua non of respect for human dignity? Hamdi is but a
recent example of the Court's disinclination to investigate who we are as
a nation as part of its obligation to preserve the noble facets of our
Enlightenment heritage, all in the name of eschewing the dreaded sin of
putting the Good before Liberty.21' And so, rather than exemplify the
triumph of the rule of law, Hamdi exposes its emptiness.212
208. Issacharoff& Pildes, supra note 41.
209. Daryl J. Levinson, Empire-building Government in Constitutional Law, 118
HARv. L. REv. 950, 960 (2005); see also SCHWARZ, supra note 10, at 204 ("Democracy is
compromised in this fractious, dollars-soaked milieu.").
210. GORE VIDAL, PERPETUAL WAR FOR PERPETUAL PEACE 158-59 (2002). Hamdan,
the military-commission case, can be understood as the Supreme Court's insistence that
Congress take a firm stand on what the Executive may do or not do in prosecuting the so-
called war on terror. See Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006). Oblique references
in terrorism legislation, and ambiguities in what is authorized, are not enough to
empower a President to do such things as try terrorists for war crimes through a military
commission. Id. The animating idea here is that Congress must be explicit in what it
authorizes the Executive to do and thereby hold itself accountable to the American
public. The Hamdan Court impliedly puts its faith in a democratic culture that an honest
appraisal suggests is severely damaged.
211. See SHKLAR, supra note 121, at 65 (discussing this wariness, couched as an
"objection ... [to] an ideology of agreement").
212. Cf MArEI & NADER, supra note 207.
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VI. Hamdi as Cultural Expression
A tension exists... between the dispersal and vacuity of the public
sphere, which is necessary to the maintenance of "consumer society,"
and those stronger allegiances and identifications which the state
must call on, repeatedly, if it is to maintain the dependencies that feed
the consumer beast. Weak citizens grow too soon tired of wars and
occupations.
lain Boal, et al.
2 13
For Enlightenment culture to flourish, and its humane values to
maintain a grip on our institutions, our public sphere needs to be
detoxified of the poison of consumerism. This is essential for the pursuit
of rational engagement in the public sphere, for a detoxified public
sphere is a crucial condition for Legality itself to survive. Legality not
only expresses the Enlightenment ideal of rational engagement; it also
depends on a broader culture of rational engagement to nourish itself.
Institutions cannot exist to shape culture, but must arise from that culture
to give expression to the ideal.
The corruption of Enlightenment culture through consumerism is
what makes U.S. empire-building both possible and necessary: possible,
because the citizenry are beguiled by the myth of American benevolence
and exceptionalism-America as a normative concept; and necessary,
because global hegemony is crucial to maintaining consumerism itself,
which has its stranglehold on us precisely to the degree that it advances
the narrow material interests of the privileged and powerful.214 At the
level of rhetoric, radical Islamists pursue a form of jihadism that attacks
our Enlightenment ideals because what they see is the dark side of that
project, with its decadence, consumerism, and associated drive to destroy
traditional ways of life and to dominate the world. Islamic terrorists are
post-modernists in that sense, motivated in part by the meta-narrative of
globalization in which the United States (and to a lesser extent, Europe)
takes on the role of "privileged vanguard of an evolutionary process that
applies to all nations. '215 Globalization, with the advent of instantaneous
213. BOAL, ET. AL., supra note 157, at 34.
214. "The globalization of markets and of the consumer mentality has meant that
global reasoning is dominated by private consumerist logic rather than public civic
logic." BARBER, supra note 190, at 166. See also MATTE1 & NADER, supra note 207, at
18 (noting "the role of consumerism in the diffusion and final acceptance of U.S. values"
and thus the "key to hegemony").
215. BERMAN, supra note 187, at 64. See generally JOSEPH STIGLITZ, GLOBALIZATION
AND ITS DISCONTENTS (2002); JOHNSON, supra note 56.
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global communication, heightens this fundamentalist revulsion and
thereby further provokes spasms of violence. 1 6 We may be seduced by
the imagery of the religious fanatic spilling out from a madrasas in
Pakistan or Saudi Arabia, existing on the far periphery of our gadget-
filled consumeristic world, indoctrinated to despise the West, and
recruited and trained by Al Qaeda to become a killing machine. But that
jihadist is a product of an intricate web of commerce that is rapidly
deluding people from non-Western cultures of their traditions and forms
of life, leading them into a cycle of wage labor and the pursuit of some
modicum of consumer power, a cycle resting atop manufactured desires
for those creature comforts and distractions that today seduce much of
the world's population.
All this is why we ought to understand Hamdi, more broadly, as an
early feature of a jurisprudence of globalization. Globalization produces
not only a jurisprudence of globalized commerce, but it also produces a
jurisprudence of detention-Hamdi being foundational in that
development. That jurisprudence of detention produced by pax
Americana globalization circles back to reform our domestic juridical
understanding of detention. Guantanamo Bay as a detention site is not
merely a feature of our so-called war on terror; it is another feature of an
entire carceral system that stretches back to the seventeenth century and
that Foucault powerfully dissects in Discipline and Punish.217 This is
why Hamdi, by blessing Guantanamo-style detention with a veil of
administrative decency, ought to be linked to a reality that this article
gestures at, a portrait of consumerist decadence that is poisoning our
culture and driving our foreign policy 218-and has for over a half
century-to the point where we are on a collision course with
fundamentalism of all sorts. 219 The juridical response to this collision
course is the rationalistic message to do it better, to accomplish the
detention for the sake of preserving life with greater regard for the
tragedy of making a mistake. Hamdi stands for an invigoration of a
carceral system flourishing within a biopower-world, where the
regulatory function of the law operates on the simplest binary
opposition-the dangerous and the normal-and where the "normal" has
become the Western consumer.
216. See generally LAWRENCE WRIGHT, THE LOOMING TOWER (2006); MICHAEL
SCHEUER, IMPERIAL HUBRIS: WHY THE WEST IS LOSING THE WAR ON TERROR (2004);
MALISE RUTHVEN, A FURY FOR GOD (2002); BARBER, supra note 190.
217. FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH, supra note 2.
218. See supra notes 190, 192.
219. See Christopher Clausen, Making Sense of America, 78 VIRGINIA QUARTERLY
REv. 278 (2002) (with a culture of "mass individualism," it is "[n]o wonder
fundamentalists of every kind see us as a moral threat").
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When lonely voices in Western culture lament that we are at war
with ourselves, we might do well to understand it, at least in part, in
precisely these terms, "for it is a sad fact that Western consumerism
explodes like a land mine in the midst of the most disadvantaged layers
of the world population., 220  That intensive, exploding consumerism
either elicits from those who feel themselves outside the globalization
promise a defeatist and dark spiritual reaction that history has taught is
violence-prone,221 or it becomes "a kind of intellectual sedative that lulls
and distracts its Third World victims while rich countries cripple them,
ensuring that they will never be able to challenge the imperial
powers. 222 The gaping, echoing silence in Hamdi is this crucial fact:
"We are witnessing a real resistance to empire.5
2 23
The instrumentalist side of Enlightenment thought, the Weberian
nightmare of disenchantment with the world, and the narrowly tailored
quest for administrative effectiveness, where sacredness is lost to the
shallow seductiveness of regulatory success, technological achievement,
and the spirit-killing hyperreality that is its telos, is the cognitive
scaffolding of an empire that must always and everywhere use or
threaten to use military force to guarantee the conditions for the
functioning of the world market, all the while masking its violence with
rule-of-law rhetoric.224 That militarized management of the global order
has and will inevitably produce the blowback of terrorism, with the
capture of "enemy combatants" who must be detained on the
instrumental logic of security that chokes off the life-affirming values
undergirding civil liberties and rights we once thought sacred to our
identity as a nation. Trial by jury, the highest vitalizing expression of
those life-affirming values, is sacrificed for the sake of a global policing
220. BORRADORI, supra note 98, at 65.
221. See BERMAN, supra note 187, at 308 ("There are undoubtedly many reasons for
the 9/11 attacks, but the fear that the American technocultural wasteland will, via U.S.
foreign policy and economic policy, overwhelm the Islamic nations surely has to be high
on the list."); AMY CHUA, WORLD ON FIRE: How EXPORTING FREE MARKET DEMOCRACY
BREEDS ETHNIC HATRED AND GLOBAL INSTABILITY 9 (2003) ("[T]he global spread of
markets and democracy is a principal, aggravating cause of group hatred and ethnic
violence throughout the non-Western world."); BARBER, supra note 190.
222. JOHNSON, supra note 56, at 261.
223. BOAL, ET. AL., supra note 157, at 167.
224. See MATrEI & NADER, supra note 207, at 33 ("Developing and accomplishing
unchallenged primacy of physical strength has produced much of the hegemonic position
of the United States. Today the United States government spends more on its army than
the aggregate nine countries beneath it in the ranking of the top spenders. Nevertheless,
in a project of expansionism, force requires ideology to gain some consent both in the
camp of the hegemonic power and among its victims. This is where the rule of law plays
a crucial role.").
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operation that finds its raison d'etre in the preservation and spreading of
a system-world consumerist way of being.
VII. Conclusion
In After the Gold Rush-Part I, I claim that foreign-policy expertise
is the same sort of fiction as managerial expertise.225 From that claim, I
argue that judicial deference to the Executive in matters of foreign affairs
is an overblown manifestation of our legitimate commitment to separated
226powers.z 6 Judicial deference in the service of a moral fiction like
"foreign-policy expertise" amounts to an avoidance of thinking
substantively about rights and obligations and of confronting urgent
globalization issues. The upshot is this: what is important to the Court in
Hamdi is not the globalization issues that generate the controversy, but
the maintenance of domestic orderliness and neutrality in the
government's pursuit of its global ambitions. This concern for neutrality
and orderliness manifests in the Court's institutional refusal to address
the fundamental concern that Guantanamo-style detention exists not to
serve the so-called war on terror, but the war on terror exists to serve
Guantanamo. In that sense, the war on terror is really a war on
ourselves, a form of auto-immune crisis, as Jacques Derrida characterizes
it.22 7 Hamdi expresses our own internal war against the criminal-justice
system, exhibiting not just our ambivalence about it, but our impulse to
detach it from its Kantian moorings and to make it administrative, and
tribunal-like. Just as our technological prowess on 9/11 was whipsawed
back against us, thereby threatening to eliminate the distinction between
war and peace, so too the fundamental anxiety we feel towards our
criminal justice process is whipsawed back to strike us hard, causing us
225. Williams, supra note 6, at 367. For the same point, and undoubtedly conveyed
more colorfully and effectively through satire, see CHRISTOPHER CERF AND VICTOR
NAVASKY, MISSION ACCOMPLISHED! OR How WE WON THE WAR 1N IRAQ: THE EXPERTS
SPEAK (2008).
226. Williams, supra note 6, at 367.
227. See BORRADORI, supra note 98 (presenting Derrida's view that today's terrorism
threat causes an auto-immune crisis-the immune system attacking the body itself). Cold
War theorist George Kennan liked to cite Edward Gibbon's observation that the Roman
Empire undid itself in attempting "to hold in obedience distant provinces." JOHN LEWIS
GADDIS, STRATEGIES OF CONTAINMENT: A CRITICAL APPRAISAL OF POSTWAR AMERICAN
NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY 47 (1982). As Kennan saw it, "the very process of trying to
maintain an empire would, sooner or later, generate resistance sufficient to undermine it."
Id. William Appleman Williams observed the same thing: "The traditional effort to
sustain democracy by expansion will lead to the destruction of democracy." WILLIAM
APPLEMAN WILLIAMS, THE TRAGEDY OF AMERICAN DIPLOMACY 312 (2d ed. W.W. Norton
1972) (1959). Montesquieu argued similarly, contending that republics could not sustain
liberty when their territorial expansion made them "imperial." See BARBER, supra note
190, at 48 n.4.
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to unleash that other collective drive, the drive towards a form of
governmental administration at the heart of Foucault's "political dream
of the plague, '228 the drive to overcome inhibitions in constructing an
MMDI system, and a drive that threatens the elimination of the
distinction between civil detention and criminal punishment. Viewed
from this prism, Hamdi is an emblem of how our legal culture, and
indicative of how Western culture itself, has become paralyzed by an
over-commitment to a form of system-sphere reasoning atrophied by a
fetish for means-ends maximization.
The dark side of the Enlightenment, which has produced a mighty
economic machine that is backed by incredible scientific and
technological achievements, has created a world that for over a half
century has existed on a precipice of annihilation. We are perhaps even
more precariously situated, largely because the internal drive within our
culture to measure most everything in terms of financial profitability-a
drive unleashed by the Enlightenment project to control and dominate-
is a compulsion with such overwhelming power that the most
economically benefitted inhabitants of this planet simply cannot see
beyond their own short-term material interests for the sake of their own
children and grandchildren. 9 My point here is that this overwhelming
cultural drive threatens the vital and already-eroded life-affirming
foundation of our criminal-justice system.
What if we looked upon a legal process, such as the criminal-justice
process, as an end in itself rather than as simply a means to adjudicate?
What if a legal process elicits our allegiance because it expresses a
particular form of human solidarity and community engagement? What
if a legal process pursues a justification that warrants the assent of the
losing party simply because that assent-ability is a good in itself? What
if a legal process is a commitment, not a tactic or instrumental feature of
govemmentality or epistemic method? What if a legal process were a
"fact" in our regime of legality-meaning, it exists in a way that justifies
228. FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH, supra note 2, at 197-99.
229. Chalmers Johnson can only hope that history will prove him to be alarmist when
he offers his gloomy "diagnosis" of our country's future:
As militarism, the arrogance of power, and the euphemisms required to justify
imperialism inevitably conflict with America's democratic structure of
government and distort its culture and basic values, I fear that we will lose our
country. If I overstate the threat, I am sure to be forgiven because future
generations will be so glad I was wrong. The danger I foresee is that the
United States is embarked on a path not unlike that of the former Soviet Union
during the 1980s .... Because the United States is far wealthier, it may take
longer .... But the similarities are obvious and it is nowhere written that the
United States, in its guise as an empire dominating the world, must go on
forever.
JOHNSON, supra note 56, at 13.
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itself rather than as an instrument for some other goal-and thereby
becomes a source of value within our culture?
Habermas's reconstruction of "communicative competence"-his
ideal-speech theory-helps illuminate the stakes in our war-on-terror
jurisprudence. 230 The point of Habermas's reconstruction is not so much
to point the way to establishing a discursive utopia, but rather, to show
that internal to the structure of speech is a telos, a direction for humanity
to achieve truth, freedom, and justice. Ethics can be rationally grounded;
facts and values, and theory and practice, can be made inseparable.
Habermas's reconstruction provides a way to understand the jury trial,
and the whole criminal adjudicatory process, as an idealized expression
of a way of life, an anticipation of a way of life where truth, freedom and
justice are possible. Internal to the criminal adjudicatory process is the
answerability thesis, and internal to the answerability thesis is a set of
values that we have come to regard as constitutive of who we are as
human beings worthy of respect and dignity. The practice of
adjudicating conflict through a jury trial-a practice that partakes in the
construction of an ideal-speech situation-contains within it a telos for
humanity, a telos that correlates with that contained in Habermas's ideal
speech situation wherein "the truth of statements is linked in the last
analysis to the intention of the good and true life."23' Hamdi, then, does
not just bypass a fact-finding process, it denigrates the vitalizing aspect
of the jury trial through a form of reasoning that is suffocating humanity
and putting it on an irreversible path towards a brave new world. It does
so through a framework of necessity that is linked to geo-political
activity that must be understood without the distorting effects of an
American exceptionalism that regards "America" as a normative
concept.
What says it all is this 2004 testimony before the House Armed
Services Committee. General James Hill, responsible for military
readiness in Latin America, essentially complained of being ignored in
this age of 9/11 anxieties. His sphere of command ought to get more
war-on-terror money, he argued, because Latin America is filled with
"radical populists," by which he meant, "[y]ou know, emerging
terrorists. 232 In the pursuit of empire, we are forever threatened by
230. See Jurgen Habermas, What is Universal Pragmatics?, in JURGEN HABERMAS,
COMMUNICATION AND THE EVOLUTION OF SOCIETY (T. McCarthy trans., 1979).
231. JURGEN HABERMAS, KNOWLEDGE AND HUMAN INTERESTS 317 (Jeremy Shapiro
trans., 1971).
232. BOAL, ET. AL., supra note 157, at 86 n.75.
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"emerging terrorists"; forever and everywhere threatened by the plague,
all the better to pursue the political dream of the plague.
The merits or demerits of Guantanamo Bay as a detention site is
beside the point, an incidental issue in the larger struggle over the future
of globalization and America's vision of its place within that future.
Guantanamo-style detention signifies, despite how it may betray our
values, our need for military hegemony, a military hegemony that could
hardly be justified where the only threat to American hegemony in a
globalized marketplace is the surging economic strength of China or a
unified Europe. It is in that sense that the war on terror serves
Guantanamo, rather than the other way around. What Guantanamo-style
detention ratifies-and thus the key to its true function, which transcends
its merits or demerits as an instrument of policy in our so-called war on
terror-is an ontology manufactured through a resurgent sovereignty,
one marked by a dividing line between compliant laborers and
consumers on the one hand, and on the other, violent terrorists who are
said to hate our liberty-loving way of life. Guantanamo-style detention
may betray our values, but it inscribes in our pax Americana
consciousness the existence of an evil, a plague, that must be
vanquished.233 It may betray our professed self-identity, but it inscribes
the major duality of our time, the happy consumer in a globalized
wonderland and the religiously fanatical terrorist bent on sabotaging the
entire edifice. Hamdi's veil of administrative decency, then, can mute
the betrayal, alleviate a bit the sting of it, all the while silently deepening
that inscription, through its Weberian rationality, through its means-ends
rationality that characterizes a system-sphere logic that Habermas warns
us against.
It is upon this platform of critique that one can understand Hamdi to
be, not a bracketed scenario, a case arising from a state of exception, but
rather an ominous cultural document of our post-9/1 1 anxieties, an
expression and reinforcement of the Western quest for control and
domination, bom of the Enlightenment, that has, centuries later,
generated this "difficult time in our Nation's history."
233. It is no surprise that the quandary over torturing captured terrorists has come to
infiltrate our public sphere. Torture is not really an information-gathering tool. It is, at
its core, a form of vanquishing the victim. See ELAINE SCARRY, THE BODY IN PAIN 29
(1985). Torture, then, is in keeping with the essential quest of the so-called war on terror.
And insofar as it accomplishes this vanquishing through the communication of complete
domination and control-the ability to inflict and withhold pain-torture is the dark
underbelly of the Enlightenment. See also DARIUS REJALI, TORTURE AND DEMOCRACY
(2008).
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